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1 
Preventing Tax arbitrage via Hybrid Mismatches: BEPS Action 2 and Developing 
Countries* 
 
Błażej Kuźniacki, 1  Alessandro Turina,2  Thomas Dubut, 3  Addy Mazz,4  Natalia Quiñones,5  Luís Eduardo 
Schoueri,6 Craig West,7 Pasquale Pistone,8 Frederik Zimmer9  
 
Abstract: The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) under Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 2 indicated that tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatch arrangements “result in a 
substantial erosion of the taxable bases of the countries concerned” and “have an overall negative impact on 
competition, efficiency, transparency and fairness.” The relevant action allowing for neutralising the effects of 
hybrid mismatch arrangements is therefore needed and justified. To achieve that purpose, the OECD 
developed different anti-hybrid rules under BEPS Action 2. In that regard, however, one may ask whether 
addressing tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches as proposed by the OECD is of interest and relevance for 
developing countries. This paper aims to map that unexplored research area by means of a comparative 
analysis in four developing countries – Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and South Africa. 
 
1 Introduction 
Corporate taxpayers have access to a variety of international tax avoidance methods allowing them to avoid 
or significantly reduce their tax burden.10 Tax arbitrage via the use of hybrid mismatches is one such method. 
Given its characteristics, it is predominantly used by multinational enterprises (MNEs), since they conduct 
international business in an increasingly integrated way, combining technology, production, marketing, and a 
diversity of related tangible and intangible services across states.11 Such multi-state integration facilitates the 
use of hybrid mismatches by MNEs to reduce the MNEs overall tax liability. This is, at the extreme, limited 
only by their financial capacity and managerial ingenuity.  
                                                       
*This paper condenses and articulates the findings set forth by several academic institutions involved in the DeSTaT Research Project 
(Sustainable Tax Governance in Developing Countries through Global Tax Transparency) as the “South Antennae” on the basis of 
questionnaires drafted by the “North Research Units” of the same Project. Funding for the Project is provided by the Research Council 
of Norway. Further information about the Project can be retrieved on the following website: 
http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/global-tax-tranparency/. The study undertaken in this paper is based on the analysis 
of answers to the questionnaires (the questionnaires were prepared by Alessandro Turina and Thomas Dubut) submitted by the South 
Antennas. The Heads of the South Antennas include Addy Mazz (Uruguay), Natalia Quiñones (Colombia), Luís Eduardo Schoueri 
(Brazil), Jennifer Roeleveld (South Africa). Questionnaires on topics agreed by all institutions party to the project are drafted (primarily 
by the North Research Units and submitted to the South Antennae. Questionnaires are addressed through local seminars which aim at 
engaging all potential relevant stakeholders. Questionnaires encompass a legal-descriptive function as well as a more policy-oriented 
dimension. The questionnaires intend to highlight convergences and divergences between the selected pool of jurisdictions. 
Convergences and divergences are monitored in relation to both specific challenges/needs and to potential solutions. Questionnaires 
have incorporated survey sections, aimed at providing an accurate representation of the current state of affairs together with more 
policy-oriented sections. 
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2009); R. Langston, Tolley’s International Tax Planning: 2011-12, London: (LexisNexis 2011). 
11 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD, 2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD at p. 25. 
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The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) under Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Action 2 stated that tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatch arrangements “result in a substantial 
erosion of the taxable bases of the countries concerned” and “have an overall negative impact on 
competition, efficiency, transparency and fairness.”12 In that regard one may ask whether or not tax arbitrage 
via hybrid mismatches has a particularly distortive impact on the economy of developing countries. If there is 
a particularly distortive effect, then developing countries include addressing the problem of tax arbitrage by 
means of hybrid mismatches deterrents on the tax policy agenda. Both over- and under-reaction to this 
phenomenon is not desirable. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to firstly to map by means of a comparative case study whether tax arbitrage via 
hybrid mismatches is recognized as a problem in four developing countries – Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, and 
South Africa – and, if so, whether the tax arbitrage problem is addressed by these states. Secondly, if 
addressed, the current solutions, including legislative plans, are mapped. Thirdly, the approaches taken by 
the countries surveyed are compared against the recommendations of the OECD under BEPS Action 2 from 
which conclusions will be drawn as to the fit of these recommendations with the current measures adopted in 
these countries. This comparative research contributes to the DeSTaT Research Project, which, from the 
perspective of this paper, focuses upon increasing sustainable tax governance in developing countries 
through global tax transparency by means of providing the background information necessary for (i) 
developing a well-functioning system of exchange of information required for building the knowledge of tax 
authorities regarding tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches; (ii) balancing the burden of proof between tax 
authorities and taxpayers related to the application of the proposed BEPS anti-hybrid rules; and (iii) providing 
a sufficient degree of practicability for taxpayers in applying proposed anti-hybrid rules. 
 
From the comparison of actions taken by the stated countries and with respect to BEPS Action 2, policy 
recommendations for dealing with tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches will be provided for these four 
developing countries. These policy recommendations may be equally beneficial to other developing 
countries. 
 
To achieve the above aims, and following this introduction, the paper is structured as follows: section 2. 
provides the introduction to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches within the framework of BEPS Action 2. In 
section 3. the comparative analysis of selected issues regarding tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in the 
surveyed developing countries is undertaken. Finally, section 4. aims to answer (i) whether the surveyed 
developing countries recognize tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches; (ii) if so, whether such mismatch 
situations are addressed by them; and (iii) if so, how such mismatches are addressed. Section 4 also 
contains tax policy recommendations for the selected developing countries. The recommendations aim at 
enhancing sustainable tax governance through global tax transparency in these countries, but may also be 
of relevance in a wider context. 
 
                                                       
12 See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 – Final Report, (OECD 2015), p. 11, International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
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2 Preventing tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches: general overview with specific reference to 
BEPS Action  
2.1 Origin of tax arbitrage: tax optimization vs tax avoidance 
The notion of “tax arbitrage” follows from the economic concept of “arbitrage” which refers to obtaining 
benefits by exploiting pricing differences across different markets.13 By analogy, “tax arbitrage” is the 
phenomenon emerging from transactions designed by taxpayers to take advantage of inconsistencies or 
disparities between tax systems,14 such as those relating to tax rates, income qualification or timing, aimed 
at either double non-taxation or tax deferral.15  
 
Due to its characteristics, tax arbitrage includes a very broad variety of behaviours and tools used by 
taxpayers all over the world. However, without doubt hybrid arrangements play a significant role in realizing 
tax arbitrage.16 The OECD confirms this position in its report on BEPS Action 2. The OECD provides that 
“international mismatches in entity and instrument characterization including, hybrid mismatch arrangements 
and arbitrage” are considered key pressure areas in the fight against the loss of tax revenues, in the 
protection of tax sovereignty and in ensuring tax fairness for both OECD and non-OECD Countries.17 
 
There is no agreement among scholars that “tax arbitrage” is a form of tax avoidance. Some scholars claim 
that tax arbitrage is simply a tax optimization tool and therefore does not have tax avoidance 
characteristics.18 Others classify tax arbitrage as tax avoidance because of the outcomes of double non-
taxation or tax deferral.19 Depending on the context, either of the abovementioned viewpoints is correct and 
therefore a single definitive meaning for “tax arbitrage” is, perhaps, inappropriate. 
 
Tax arbitrage may be considered a tool of tax optimization rather than a form of tax avoidance if it follows 
from genuine business activities that are not undertaken by taxpayers solely or predominantly to obtain tax 
benefits.20 For instance, the Colombia input clearly shows that taxpayers may use sophisticated financial 
instruments in order to achieve efficient project finance goals, or to limit the decision-making powers of 
“angel investors” with no technical knowledge of the business project developed by the company. The 
mismatch created by these instruments is often a secondary product of a fundamental business decision and 
is many times not decisive for the taxpayer. Such use demonstrates that hybrid financial instruments are not 
                                                       
13 See L. Gagnon and G.A. Karolyi, Multi-Market Trading and Arbitrage, 2003, p. 2. See more on the origin of the notion of “tax 
arbitrage” in A. Majdańska, Tax arbitrage a obejście prawa podatkowego, Prawo i Podatki 10 (2011), pp. 12-17. 
14 See the definition for “arbitrage” at the IBFD Tax Glossary. 
15 See more in R.S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and International Tax Regime, 61 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 4 (2007), pp. 130-138, 
Journals IBFD; J. Bundgaard, Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage Using Inbound Financial Instruments Curbed in Denmark by Unilateral 
Reclassification of Debt into Equity, 62 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 1 (2008), pp. 33-42, Journals IBFD. 
16 See M. Brittingham and M. Bulter, OECD Report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Search for a New Paradigm or Is the Proposed 
Tax Order a Distant Galaxy Many Lights Years Away?, 20 Intl. Transfer Pricing J. 4 (2013), , pp. 238-242, Journals IBFD. 
17  OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD 2013), p. 6, International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
18 See H. D. Rosenbloom, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System, 53 Tax Law 
Review 2 (2000), p. 142; A. Krahmal, International hybrid instruments: Jurisdiction dependent characterisation, 5 Houston Business and 
Tax Law Journal (2005), p. 115. 
19 See e.g. Avi-Yonah, supra n. 15, pp. 137-138; Bundgaard, supra n. 15, p. 33. 
20 The good example of a tax arbitrage’s practice that constituted tax optimization was analyzed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ), UK: ECJ, 22 Dec. 2010, Case C-277/09, Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs v RBS Deutschland 
Holdings GmbH, [2010] ECR I-13805, paragraphs 20-21 and 50-55, ECJ Case Law IBFD. See also J. Bundgaard, Hybrid Financial 
Instruments and Primary EU Law – Part 2, 53 Eur.Taxn. 12 (2013), p. 592, Journals IBFD. 
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only driven by tax but also by sound business reasons, for instance to obtain lower costs of financing, 
greater financial flexibility and a better credit rating.21 
 
While hybrid mismatches may have purposes other than tax avoidance (as determined on a case-by-case 
basis), the focus of this paper is the use of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches to deliberately (mainly) take 
advantage of inconsistencies or disparities between tax systems in order to achieve tax avoidance, such as 
deduction with non-inclusion, double deductions, or any other form of reducing the tax burden. Illustrative 
schemes include examples such as the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich” which relies on the hybrid mismatch 
regarding the taxable status of a subsidiary company established in Ireland.22 The term “tax arbitrage” in the 
context of this study is as a sub-concept of tax avoidance through the use of hybrid mismatch arrangements.  
2.2 Preventing tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches under BEPS Action 2: general description and 
initial doubts 
The OECD in its March 2012 Report on “Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements” listed hybrid arrangements as 
follows: (i) entities that are treated as transparent for tax purposes in one country and as non-transparent in 
another country; (ii) entities that are resident in two different countries for tax purposes at the same time; (iii) 
financial instruments that are treated differently for tax purposes in different countries (e.g. are considered as 
debt in the country of the capital borrower and as equity in the country of the capital lender); (iv) transfer 
arrangements that are treated as transfer of ownership for one country’s tax purposes but not for tax 
purposes of another country.23 In July 2013 the OECD issued the “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting”,24 which focused on a number of practical measures that should be adopted in order to tackle these 
problems. In September 2014, the OECD published the interim report on Action 2,25 and more recently, in 
October 2015, the final report on Action 2 was published. 
 
BEPS Action 2 targets only those types of mismatches that rely on a hybrid element that aims at obtaining: 
(i) deduction/no inclusion (D/NI outcome), i.e. payments that are deductible under the rules of the payer 
jurisdiction and are not included in the ordinary income of the payee; (ii) double deduction (DD outcome), i.e. 
payments that give rise to two deductions in respect of the same payment; and (iii) indirect D/NI, i.e. 
payments that are deductible under the rules of the payer jurisdiction and that are set-off by the payee 
against a deduction under a hybrid mismatch arrangement. 26  Action 2 proposes to neutralize these 
outcomes of hybrid mismatch arrangements through:  
                                                       
21 See Bundgaard, supra n. 15, p. 43. 
22 In the Google Inc. case, the subsidiary was incorporated in Ireland but locally controlled in Bermuda and therefore the US treated this 
company as tax resident of Ireland, since US tax law recognizes the jurisdiction of organization or incorporation as the tax jurisdiction 
(IRC section 7701(a)(4) and (a)(5) (defining foreign and domestic corporations)). Ireland, in turn, considered it as a tax resident of 
Bermuda, because under the Irish tax law determining corporate residency, a company is resident in a jurisdiction in which actual 
control of the company resides (Ireland Finance Act 1999, section 82). In consequence of this hybrid entity mismatch, the company’s 
income was neither taxed in US nor in Ireland. The income was also not taxed in Bermuda, since there is no corporate tax in that 
jurisdiction. See more C. Fuest, C. Spengel, K.Finke, J. Heckemeyer and H. Nusser, Profit Shifting and “Aggressive” Tax Planning by 
Multinational Firms: Issues and Options for Reform, World Tax J. 10 (2013), , pp. 310-312, Journals IBFD; J. Sandell The Double Irish 
and the Dutch Sandwich: How Some U.S. Companies Are Flummoxing the Tax Code, Tax Notes International (2012), 27 August, pp. 
868-877. Similar conclusion could be drawn in relation to the scheme of Apple inc., see A. Ting, iTax—Apple’s International Tax 
Structure and the Double Non-Taxation Issue, British Tax Review 1 (2014), pp. 40-71. 
23  OECD, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, (OECD 2012), p. 7, International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD. 
24 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD 2013), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD. 
25 See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, (OECD 2014), International Organizations’ Documentation 
IBFD. 
26 See OECD 2015, supra n. 12, pp. 16-17. 
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“(a) Changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention to ensure that hybrid instruments and entities (as 
well as dual resident entities) are not used to obtain the benefits of treaties unduly; (b) Domestic law 
provisions that prevent exemption or non-recognition for payments that are deductible by the payer; 
(c) Domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a payment that is not includible in income by 
the recipient (and is not subject to taxation under CFC or similar rules); (d) Domestic law provisions 
that deny a deduction for a payment that is also deductible in another jurisdiction; and (e) Where 
necessary, guidance on co-ordination or tie-breaker.”27  
 
Indeed, the domestic anti-hybrid rules recommended by the OECD “take the form of linking rules that align 
the tax treatment of an instrument or entity with the tax treatment in the counterparty jurisdiction”.28 The 
OECD’s recommended linking rule requires recognition and understanding of the tax provisions of the 
payee’s country by the payer’s country (primary rule), and vice versa (defensive rule).29 
 
The final report on Action 2 spans 458 pages, making it the most extensive and comprehensive as well as 
perhaps the most complex and difficult to implement of all the 15 actions of the BEPS project.30 The next 
part of this study provides the comparative analysis of selected issues of tax arbitrage from hybrid 
mismatches in the selected developing states while making references to the final report on Action 2 where 
appropriate.  
 
3 Comparative analysis of selected issues regarding the tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
among the surveyed developing countries 
 
3.1 Initial remarks on tackling tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches among the surveyed 
developing countries 
This section provides a comparative analysis of the issue of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches among the 
developing countries surveyed. The reports in response to the questionnaires used for the original fieldwork 
research submitted by the South Antennas are used as the basis for this analysis. 
 
The reports forming the basis for this paper focused on the problems posed by deductibility regimes across 
different systems with particular reference to: (i) cases of double deduction (or “double-dip”), where a 
deduction or loss is claimed for tax purposes in two different jurisdictions and, (ii) cases of misalignment, 
where the deduction is combined with the non-inclusion of the payment in the income of the recipient.31 
 
                                                       
27 Id., p. 16. 
28 Id., p. 11. 
29 See A. Rust, BEPS Action 2: 2014 Deliverable – Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements and its Compatibility with 
the Non-discrimination Provisions in Tax Treaties and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, British Tax Review 3 
(2015), p. 324. 
30 Since the Report on BEPS Action 2 contains about 458 pages, compared to a total of only 1,500 pages for the reports on the other 14 
BEPS actions altogether, it makes the Report on Action 2 being by far the longest 2015 Final Report. 
31 See also R. Eicke, Tax Planning with Holding Companies – Repatriation of US Profits from Europe, Alphen aan den Rijin: Kluwer Law 
International, 2009, pp. 24 and 378 et seq.  Such issues have been identified as key areas of intervention also by the OECD in its BEPS 
Project, see, in particular, OECD 2015, supra n. 12, p. 17, in particular, paragraphs 7 and 8. 
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In sections 3.2. to 3.6. that follow, the South Antenna reports provide the basis for the comparative analysis, 
with an emphasis on: surveying the perception of the problem of cross-border tax arbitrage arising from 
hybrid mismatches among a selected pool of developing countries; putting the respective systems to test in 
the light of some prevailing hybrid mismatch pattern; and, most importantly, testing potential solutions to the 
problem.  
 
Many of the solutions proposed in Action 2 may not appear strikingly innovative in isolation. Nevertheless, a 
mix thereof may be successful in striking a balance between effectiveness and sustainability. A key 
innovative element in this respect may be represented by the possibilities offered by forms of enhanced 
administrative co-operation in the area of information sharing. In particular the sharing of relevant 
experiences with respect to hybrid mismatch arrangements and its impact on the deterrence, detection and 
reaction strategies that developing countries could adopt when addressing this issue, may be useful. 
 
The following aspects arising from the surveyed countries will be addressed: 
(i) general perception of tax arbitrage utilizing hybrid mismatches (section 3.2.); 
(ii) an in-depth overview of the case studies outcomes concerning tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
(section 3.3.); 
(iii) the current and prospective domestic and tax treaty provisions and practice against tax arbitrage 
achieved using hybrid mismatches (section 3.4); 
(iv) current and potential reactions of the surveyed countries to OECD inputs within the BEPS project 
(section 3.5); 
(v) some policy perspectives (section 3.6); and finally 
(vi) section 4 of this study provides the conclusions and recommendations regarding the way of addressing 
tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches by surveyed countries. 
 
3.2 General perception of tax arbitrage utilizing hybrid mismatches 
In general there is evidence in the public domain, that South Africa has considered tax arbitrage arising from 
hybrid mismatches while in Colombia, Brazil, and Uruguay it is less evident when considering the documents 
publicly available. 
 
One of the first initiatives on the issue, in Colombia, was discussed in the “Jornadas Colombianas de 
Derecho Tributario” (ICDT) in the context of the DeSTaT Project. More recently, in May 2016, Colombia has 
actively participated in all BEPS discussions including the approval of Action 2. Furthermore, at the III 
Conference on International Taxation that took place in Bogota at Universidad del Rosario on May 18th and 
19th, 2016,32 the Colombian advisor to the Tax Administration Chief on International Tax Policy noted that 
Colombia is reviewing the possibility of denying a deduction whenever the taxpayer cannot demonstrate that 
the income has resulting in taxation paid in the jurisdiction of the recipient. It is noteworthy that the three top 
administrative officers dealing with international tax issues, all of which spoke at the above conference, hold 
international tax graduate degrees in Europe or the US all of which would have addressed the issues related 
                                                       
32 See online: http://actl.uva.nl/news-events/events/content/conferences/2016/05/international-tax-conference-bogota---colombia---18-
19-may-2016.html. 
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to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches.33 The Colombian reporter further noted that tax practitioners are 
widely aware of the methods of reducing or avoiding tax burdens via hybrid mismatches and occasionally 
organize events to discuss tax-planning opportunities through the use of mismatches.34 Unfortunately, there 
has been no dialogue between tax practitioners and the tax administration on the use of hybrid mismatches. 
 
The reporters for Brazil and Uruguay noted that neither tax administration nor the Brazilian and Uruguayan 
academic community have, to date, extensively addressed specific initiatives concerning tax arbitrage via 
hybrid mismatches.35 
 
The South African response to hybrid mismatches differs significantly from the other countries analysed. 
Firstly, the South African Government has signalled its concern with hybrid debt instruments and 
arrangements that create a tax deduction in South Africa without that amount being taxed elsewhere.36 
Secondly, legislative amendments aimed at addressing the issues of international tax arbitrage and hybrid 
mismatches have been introduced, e.g. hybrid debt instrument rules37 and debt limitation rules on loans with 
non-resident connected persons.38  
 
The South African reaction to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches likely follows from its membership of the 
G20. South Africa is a co-signatory of the September 2013 G20 Leader’s Declaration in which the OECD’s 
BEPS programme was endorsed39, and the OECD’s Declaration on Base Erosion and Profit Sharing.40  
 
Although Brazil is a member of the G20, its response to hybrid mismatches has not accelerated at the pace 
of South Africa. The differing reaction levels may be attributable to a number of different factors such as the 
willingness of South Africa to pilot or participate as a first adopter to numerous anti-avoidance initiatives.  
South Africa also has a larger network of treaties41 facilitating exchange of information which may be used to 
                                                       
33 In the case of Natalia Aristizabal, who is the lead administration advisor on international tax and is tasked with participating in the 
OECD and the Global Forum, she holds an LLM (international tax programme) from Harvard. José Alejandro Mejía, who is the 
Subdirector for International Tax, he has a Masters on International Tax Law from Panthéon Assas (Paris II) and is often in Paris with 
the Committee for Fiscal Affairs (CFA) at the OECD. Finally, Oswaldo González, who is the advisor for tax treaty negotiations, holds an 
LLM in International Tax law from FU and is usually tasked with US tax issues. In addition to these people, there are other officers and 
contractors that were educated in international tax amongst others in New York University (NYU), Leiden, or the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, WU). As noted by D. Quiñones at the Conference on “A Sustainable Path for 
Tax Transparency in Developing Countries”, see online: http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/global-tax-
tranparency/events/conferences/a-sustainable-path-for-tax-transparency-in-develop.html (27 June 2016). 
34 Colombia report at 5. 
35 Brazil report at 5; Uruguay report at 6-7. 
36 SARS Media Rules of 29 April 2013, Request for Public Comment for Incorporation into Forthcoming 2013 Tax Laws Amendment Bill: 
Proposed Limitations Against Excessive Interest Tax Deductions, available online at:    
http://www.sars.gov.za/Media/MediaReleases/Documents/Media%20Release%2029%20April%202013%20-
%20Proposed%20limitations%20against%20excessive%20interest%20tax%20deductions.pdf. Moreover, the role of hybrid financial 
instruments in tax avoidance arrangements was discussed in SARS discussion paper of November 2005 on the proposed revision to 
the general anti-avoidance provisions of section 103 of the Income Tax Act, Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the 
Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962), Prepared by Law Administration South African Revenue Service  (November 2005), para 
6.3.1, p25, available online at: http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/DiscPapers/LAPD-LPrep-DP-2005-01%20-
%20Discussion%20Paper%20Tax%20Avoidance%20Section%20103%20of%20Income%20Tax%20Act%201962.pdf. 
37 Section 8F and 8FA of the Income Tax Act. 
38 Section 23M of the Income Tax Act 
39  G20 Leader’s Declaration, September 2013, para 12, available online at: 
https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG.pdf. 
40 OECD Declaration on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, available online at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/C-MIN(2013)22-FINAL-ENG.pdf. 
41 South Africa report at 3-4, with reference to tax treaties including exchange of information’s provisions, the OECD’s Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, several bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs), and an 
intergovernmental FATCA agreement with the US. 
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facilitate the identification of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. There also appears to be greater 
engagement with the topic by legal commentators in South Africa.42 
 
There is no readily available evidence to suggest that the high awareness of the tax arbitrage problem in 
question in South Africa triggers either a co-operative or a confrontational stance between tax practitioners 
and the tax administration.43 
 
3.3 In depth overview of case studies concerning country perspectives on tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches 
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 contain an analysis of cases which trigger two classical misalignments stemming 
from hybrid mismatches: (i) a deduction or loss is claimed for tax purposes in two different jurisdictions 
(double deduction (or “double-dip”), and (ii) the deduction is combined with the non-inclusion of the payment 
in the income of the recipient. Many of the questions that occur in these case studies have not been 
discussed in the surveyed countries before and therefore some of them could not be answered and answers 
to others have been elaborated on by the reporters without them being able to refer to domestic practice in 
their countries. Thus, many of their answers go beyond the mere “reports” and constitute creative ideas that 
may serve as a starting point for further discussions on the prevention of tax arbitrage through hybrid 
mismatches in the surveyed countries. 
 
In section 3.3.3 selected countries’ perspectives on tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches are analysed.  
These include: existing case law on tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches (section 3.3.3.1.), theoretical cases 
and schemes of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in surveyed countries (section 3.3.3.2.), differences (if 
any) between tax arbitrage carried out by multinational corporations and high net worth individuals (section 
3.3.3.3.), and finally revenue effects of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches on the tax systems of the 
surveyed countries (section 3.3.3.4.). 
 
In the case studies that follow in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the reporters were asked to analyse, on the basis 
of statutory law and case law, whether the arrangements described in the five following hypothetical 
examples might be carried out with the involvement of an entity situated in their country by adopting both the 
perspective of country A and country B, i.e. in scenario A and B below.  Where assumptions were 
inapplicable in the surveyed country, the reporters sometimes provided responses amending the scenario to 
reflect the tax treatment of the entity.   
3.3.1 Double deduction  
3.3.1.1 Double deduction (I) (making use of a hybrid subsidiary borrowing money) 
The following assumptions were made under the first case triggering double deduction (see also Diagram I 
below): 
                                                       
42  See particularly Silke on International Tax, chapter 8, Cape Town: LexisNexis, South Africa; Professional Tax Handbook 2013/2014. 
43 South Africa report at 4. 
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(i) a parent corporation (A Co.) that is resident in Country A owns a subsidiary that is resident in Country B 
(B Co.); 
(ii) B Co. is treated as a corporation for Country B tax purposes but is treated as a tax transparent 
partnership/permanent establishment (PE) of the parent corporation for Country A tax purposes; 
(iii) B Co. issues debt to a third party (Bank) and it incurs interest expenses; 
(iv) B Co. deducts the interest for Country B tax purposes; 
(v) the parent (A Co.) also deducts the interest for Country A tax purposes because the subsidiary (B Co.) is 
treated as a tax transparent partnership/PE of the parent for Country A tax purposes, and therefore the 
parent – which is the head office from the perspective of country A – is treated as paying the interest 
paid by the subsidiary/PE for Country A tax purposes. 
 
The taxpayer has designed the scheme only for deducting the same interest expense twice (in Country A 
and in Country B) and therefore we may conclude that the scheme represents tax arbitrage (avoidance) via 
hybrid mismatch. The double deduction would be possible only if Country A has in force rules allowing for 
the subsidiary in Country B to be treated as a tax transparent partnership (or rules similar to the US “check 
the box” with an option to treat the subsidiary as tax transparent partnership). The first question is therefore 
whether surveyed countries have such rules in force. A further variation considers the consequences of this 
scheme for countries with CFC rules (Brazil/South Africa/Uruguay) and without CFC rules (Colombia), as 
well as countries (where head office is located, i.e. Country A) taxing income attributed to a PE (Colombia) 
and countries exempting such income from taxation (Uruguay). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram I: Double Deduction (I) 
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Scenario A: Country A is the surveyed country 
The reporters of all surveyed countries agreed that this scheme would not achieve the desired effects from 
the perspective of their countries if it would be Country A for a variety of reasons. The failure of this scheme 
took no cognisance of the deduction of expenses by the subsidiary in Country B. Expenses incurred abroad 
by a subsidiary would not be deductible in their Countries.44  
 
In Uruguay, due to the territorial tax system, whether the company in Country B is treated as a tax 
transparent partnership or as a subsidiary is irrelevant. Thus, interest paid as expenses by the foreign tax 
transparent partnership/PE of the parent Uruguayan company will be disregarded for Uruguayan tax 
purposes.45 
 
The Brazilian reporters explain that even though positive and negative results earned by foreign entities 
controlled by Brazilian parent companies may be consolidated for purposes of application of the Brazilian 
CFC rules until 2022,46 the scheme is not effective in this case as foreign branches of Brazilian companies 
are fictitiously treated as separate legal entities (e.g. subsidiaries of Brazilian parents). The interest would be 
considered as an expense of the foreign branch and not of the Brazilian headquarters.47 This means that the 
Brazilian company will add the branch’s profit before tax (but post deduction of the interest) to its taxable 
basis under the Brazilian CFC rules. Conversely, if the branch had losses, these losses are only deducted 
against foreign profits of other branches. Hence, the foreign interest expense cannot be recognized as an 
expense incurred in Brazil for Brazilian income tax purposes. 
 
                                                       
44 See Brazil report at 6; Colombia report at 8; South Africa report at 8; and Uruguay report at 8. 
45 As a matter of fact, this is the same result as in countries with worldwide tax systems (tax resident taxpayers are liable for their 
worldwide income), which exempt foreign income of tax residents from taxation. For example, many EU member states exempt certain 
types of foreign sourced income (usually active income) of their own residents from taxation while applying the exemption method of 
avoidance of double taxation, see Y. Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 Tax Law Review 2 (2003), pp. 286-
287; H.J. Ault, and B.J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis, 2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2004, pp. 357-360; K.S. Blanchard, BEPS Action 3: How Not to Engage with CFC Rules, Premier International Tax Library 
2015, 1 July 2015, access online: http://www.bna.com/beps-action-not-n17179928956/. As a result of the exemption of foreign sourced 
active income (such as PE’s income), losses or interest incurred in connection with such income of tax residents are not allocated to the 
residents. 
46 See F. Tonanni and N. Gomes, Brazil - Corporate Taxation - Country Analyses, IBFD: Amsterdam, Tax Research Platform (Last 
Reviewed: 20 October 2015), p. 39. 
47 Article 1, §1º of Law 9,532/1997 and Article 89 of Law 12,973 of 2014. 
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The Colombian reporter stated that the scheme would not work if Colombia is Country A as Colombia does 
not have autonomous rules for classifying a foreign entity as a tax transparent partnership. Deduction of the 
interest expense in Colombia would be possible only if the subsidiary was found to constitute a PE of the 
Colombian company under a tax treaty and if the interest expense was attributable under the treaty to the 
Colombian company and not to the PE. However, such rules are very unlikely and do not apply in these 
cases. Hence, the deduction in Country B would not be possible, which does not achieve the desired tax 
avoidance outcome.  
 
Finally, the South Africa reporter indicated that the example assumption to treat the foreign subsidiary as tax 
transparent would not hold true in South Africa as no provision exists to allow for such treatment.  
Accordingly, the interest incurred by the subsidiary would not be deductible by the South African parent. The 
South African reporter also explained that even though South Africa does have CFC rules which may 
operate to include the subsidiary’s net income in the parent’s taxable income, these rules would not permit a 
net loss to be included in the parent company’s taxable income. Thus it would seem that the South African 
CFC rules would not operate to facilitate a double deduction of this interest (likewise in case of the Brazilian 
CFC rules).  
 
Scenario B: Country B is the surveyed country 
In this scenario, the reporters of all surveyed countries agreed that their countries could be involved in such 
a scheme as Country B, unsurprisingly, would allow a deduction for interest.  While the Uruguayan reporter 
did not indicate any tax provisions that may be used to strike down this scheme from operating in Uruguay,48 
observations and caveats were provided by other reporters. The Colombian reporter observed that the 
above double deductions scheme is a common tax planning structure in the financial industry in Colombia as 
no legal basis exists in Colombia to undermine its effects if the subsidiary is a Colombian resident 
taxpayer.49  The South African reporter warned that success of such a scheme may be neutralised via the 
GAAR,50 if the involvement of the South African subsidiary and/or loan arrangement in this scheme did not 
have commercial substance.51 
 
The Brazilian reporters equally noted no tax provision in force in Brazil which prevents an undue tax 
deduction in a foreign jurisdiction derived from interest expenses incurred in Brazil.52 They further noted that 
the presence of tax transparent partnerships/PE of foreign legal entities in Brazil is very uncommon due to 
the onerous requirements and bureaucratic hurdles involved. In practice in Brazil the local presence of 
foreign entities in Brazil is in the form of a locally incorporated subsidiary. Moreover, Brazilian legislation on 
permanent establishments is not usually enforced because the tax administration treats the direct local 
presence of foreign entities as a resident taxpayer and subjects their payments abroad to withholding tax. 
Accordingly, the involvement of Brazil in this scheme as Country B is possible, but it follows merely from the 
treatment of the Brazilian parent company as tax transparent by Country A. The success of such a scheme 
                                                       
48 See Uruguay report at 8. 
49 See Colombia report at 8. 
50 Section 80A of the Income Tax Act (ITA), Act No. 58 of 1962). 
51 See South Africa report at 9. 
52 See Brazil report at 6. 
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in Brazil (and generally the other surveyed countries) does not follow from the local tax law, but from the 
foreign tax law. 
 
3.3.1.2 Double deduction (II)53 (making use of an intermediary hybrid entity borrowing money) 
The following assumptions were made under the second case triggering double deduction: 
(i) a holding company in Country A indirectly holds an operating company in Country B; 
(ii) the indirect control is exercised through a hybrid entity situated in Country B; 
(iii) in particular, the hybrid entity would qualify as transparent from the perspective of Country A and opaque 
from the perspective of Country B; 
(iv) the hybrid entity in Country B borrows money and uses the loan for a capital contribution into the 
operating company in Country B; 
(v) the hybrid entity in Country B pays interest on the loan; 
(vi) for Country B purposes the hybrid entity can deduct interest expenses from its corporate income; 
(vii) for Country A purposes the hybrid entity is a pass-through, so that the holding company in Country A 
can deduct the same interest expenses. 
Consequently, this scheme’s purpose is to deduct the same interest expenses in Country A and in Country B. 
 
Diagram II: Double Deduction (II) 
 
 
 
 
Scenario A: Country A is the surveyed country 
                                                       
53 Cf. “double deduction” with hybrid entity example in OECD (2012), supra n.23, paragraphs 13-15 at p. 8. 
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The reporters of Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay concluded that their countries could not be involved in such 
a scheme as Country A with assumed effects of the scheme for the same reasons as in the previous case 
(Double Deduction I: Scenario A).54  
 
The reporter of South Africa analysed this case under two assumptions. In the first instance, it was assumed 
that the hybrid entity is assumed to be a trust which is a resident in Country B. If the income net of trust 
expenses is vested in the holding company resident in South Africa, the South African tax law would 
effectively permit the double deduction. In the second instance, the hybrid entity is assumed to be a 
partnership resident in Country B. In this instance, the double deduction would not occur if the holding 
company is resident in South Africa, irrespective of the tax treatment of the partnership by a country of its 
location (Country B). The South African tax law does not allow for a deduction of an interest expense 
incurred either for purposes of producing foreign dividends or for purposes of a foreign return of capital, i.e. 
taking a loan in order to buy shares in a company from which the dividends will be distributed or capital gains 
will be received upon the disposal of the shares.55 
 
Both the trust and partnership hybrid entities were considered in the Colombian report.  The Colombian 
reporter stated that the trust assumption would not work as Colombia only treats domestic trusts as 
transparent. Foreign trusts are treated as opaque. The Colombian entity would only pay tax on distributions 
from the trust or could include a tax loss upon the liquidation of the trust, provided that the value is 
depreciated compared to the last valuation reported by the Colombian company for the investment in the 
trust. The partnership assumption would also not achieve the intended result of this case study.  All entities, 
apart from domestic trusts, are treated as opaque. Consequently, considering both trusts and partnerships, 
there is no possibility of a mismatch where Colombia acts as Country A. 
 
In the Brazilian context, the Brazilian legislation does not provide for transparent entities.  As a result, neither 
a trust or a partnership could be used to achieve the outcome in this case.  Specifically, the trust assumption 
cannot not apply to Brazil as there is no legislation on trusts nor any other form of segregated assets with 
similar features. A foreign trust would therefore be recognised as a company (assuming the holding 
company acts as the trustee). Similarly, a partnership would be an opaque entity for Brazilian purposes. 
 
As Uruguay has no tax legislation with respect to trusts or partnerships, the case would not achieve the 
desired result in Uruguay.   
 
Scenario B: Country B is the surveyed country 
Apart from the South African reporter,56 all other surveyed countries reported that this case would achieve 
the desired result where their country acted in the position of country B.57  This is perhaps unsurprising as in 
this case, Country B sees the hybrid entity as opaque, aligning its treatments with that of other corporate 
entities.  However, the reporters of Brazil cautioned that the deduction of the interest payments for the hybrid 
                                                       
54 See Brazil report at 7; Colombia report at 9; and Uruguay report at 9. 
55 See section 23(q) in conjunction with section 1 and section 11(1)(a) of the ITA. See South Africa report at 11-12. 
56 This regards situations in which the hybrid entity is either a trust or a partnership according to South African tax law. See South Africa 
report at 12-13. 
57 See Brazil report at 7; Colombia report at 9; and Uruguay report at 9. 
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entity in Brazil may be challenged by the tax authorities if the payments do not qualify as “necessary 
expenses”.58 One should also bear in mind that the interest payments are associated with income from 
dividends which are exempted from taxation in Brazil and therefore the deductibility may work in practice 
only if the hybrid entity has other taxable income against which the interest can be offset.59 A challenge 
against the interest deduction may also be possible in Colombia for similar reasons. It would also appear 
that this case is unlikely to arise in South America (based on the reports of Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay) as 
the tax legislation in these countries does not appear to cater for tax transparent partnerships. Accordingly, 
the two assumptions, as reported by the South African reporter below, are not applicable for Brazilian, 
Uruguayan, and Colombian tax purposes.60 
 
South Africa does recognise both partnerships and trusts (usually) as transparent entities.  For a partnership, 
the case will not bring the desired result of double deduction as the assumption to treatment the hybrid entity 
(partnership) as opaque in South Africa would not hold true.  As a result of the entity being tax transparent in 
both Country A and Country B (South Africa), the double deduction does not arise. Where the hybrid entity is 
a trust, the ineffectiveness of the scheme in the South African reporters’ view is caused by the lack of the 
possibility to deduct interest payments by the hybrid entity (trust), since the interest is neither incurred for 
purposes of a “trade” carried on by this entity61 nor is the trust a company acquiring equity shares in an 
operating company.62 As a result, the interest deductibility would fail in the trust. 
  
3.3.1.3 Interim conclusions in respect to the effectiveness of Double Deduction schemes 
The analysis so far shows that both envisaged double deduction schemes (I) and (II) would not lead to the 
double deduction outcome whenever a surveyed country would be Country A (scenario A), i.e. a residence 
country of a parent company providing a loan to a foreign subsidiary. The only exception exists in relation to 
South Africa in scheme (II) under the assumptions that the hybrid entity situated in Country B is a trust and 
income net of trust expenses is vested in a holding company resident in South Africa. Beyond this limited 
instance, no double deduction occurs. This mainly follows from the fact that none of the surveyed countries 
have in force tax provisions to treat a foreign subsidiary as a tax transparent entity. Moreover, in the case of 
Uruguay, the said consequence is caused by its territorial tax system, that is the interest paid by a foreign 
subsidiary of the parent Uruguayan company will be disregarded for Uruguayan tax purposes, likewise the 
income derived by the subsidiary. 
 
Key to the failure of scenario A for both double deduction cases (see sections 3.3.1.1. and 3.3.1.2.) are the 
following: 
                                                       
58 However, the Administrative Board of Tax Appeals (CARF) has twice decided favourably to the deductibility of interest expenses 
incurred in connection with the acquisition of equity interest, see Decision n. 101-96.152, of May 23, 2007 (“the PMPAR case”) and 
Decision n. 107-09.420, of June 25, 2008 (“the Unilever case”). See Brazil report at 7. 
59 See Brazil report at 7. 
60 Apart from tax treatment of domestic trusts in Colombia as tax transparent. Nevertheless, the scheme would work in Colombia only if 
the hybrid entity was a partnership or a corporation that has been “checked-the-box” in Country A (the US). It would not work if the 
company chose a domestic trust as a hybrid entity, as interest would not be deductible in the Colombian trust. The point is, though, that 
it would not make sense for a foreign investor to choose a domestic trust in Colombia when it can choose a corporation or partnership 
that can easily be “checked” under jurisdictions such as the US. 
61 See Solaglass Finance Company (Pty) Ltd. v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (125/1989) [1990] ZASCA 157; 1991 (2) SA 257 
(AD); [1991] 1 All SA 339(A) (30 November 1990). See also S11(a) of the ITA read with S23(g) of the ITA. 
62 See S24O(2) of the ITA. 
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(i) For Uruguay, the application of a territorial tax system; 
(ii) For Brazil and Colombia, the treatment of such hybrid entities as opaque in all instances, or deeming 
rules classifying such entities as opaque; 
(iii) While South Africa would recognise the hybrid entity as transparent, various limitations prevented the 
success of the cases. Furthermore, in the case of a foreign partnership, only profits would be 
consolidated into the resident taxpayer’s taxable income. Foreign losses may not be set off against 
domestic profits.   
 
Conversely the double deduction outcome could be achieved in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay in scenario B 
for both double deduction cases (see section 3.3.1.1. and 3.3.1.2.), i.e. where the surveyed country is the 
residence country of an intermediary hybrid subsidiary paying interest to the parent. The success of the 
cases in each of these countries may be due to a lack of legal tools for detecting the hybrid treatment of 
such entities in the other State.  In addition, there appears to be a lack of anti-hybrid rules to adequately 
neutralize the effect of the scheme in these countries.63  
 
For South Africa in case of double deduction (I), while double deduction may be possible, there is a risk that 
the GAAR may be applied by tax authorities to neutralize the double deduction outcome if the involvement of 
the South African subsidiary and/or loan arrangement in this scheme does not have commercial substance. 
In case of double deduction (II) the desired outcome of double deduction is not achieved.  The failure of this 
case is as a result of anti-hybrid rules, but rather as a result of the general rules for the taxation of 
partnerships64 and the general rule for the deductibility of interest.65 
3.3.2 Deduction/non- inclusion 
3.3.2.1 Deduction/non-inclusion (I) 
The following assumptions were made under the first case triggering deduction with non-inclusion: 
(i) A holding company situated in Country H (Holdco H) controls a subsidiary in Country A (Subco A) and 
a subsidiary in Country B (Subco B); 
(ii) the subsidiary in Country A is a partner of a partnership established in the same Country; 
(iii) the subsidiary in Country A receives a bank loan; 
(iv) the resources provided by the loan are invested in the partnership in Country A in the form of an equity 
contribution; 
(v) the partnership lends money to the subsidiary situated in Country B; 
(vi) interest paid by the subsidiary in Country B to the partnership in Country A is deductible in the former 
Country; 
                                                       
63 The Colombian reporter explained that the analysed transactions would only be seen as hybrids if Colombia obtains information on 
the treatment abroad by means of an MDR, spontaneous exchange of information or a whistle-blower. Then the GAAR could be 
applied. However, the taxpayer could still demonstrate a business purpose or compliance with the transfer pricing regime.  
64 All partnerships are transparent entities for South African tax purposes and therefore whenever a partnership located in South Africa 
is tax transparent from the perspective of a country of residence of its foreign partner, the double deduction effect assumed in the 
double deduction case (II) (see section 3.3.1.2.) does not appear. 
65 The interest expense would need to be incurred for purposes of a “trade” carried on by the entity paying the interest (noting that the 
earning of dividend income is not a trade).  Alternatively, where the entity is a company, the interest may be taken into account on a 
loan to acquire equity shares in an operating company.  As the hybrid entities were not companies, the case failed.  
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(vii) the interest income is not taxable in the hands of the partnership in Country A, because the partnership 
is tax transparent under tax law of Country A; 
(viii) the interest income is re-characterised from income from a bank loan provided by the partnership in 
Country A into income from equity in the hands of the subsidiary in Country A and Country A provides 
for exemption for such kind of income; 
(ix) Country H features CFC rules. However, as a result of the exemption of the income from equity, there 
is no income to be attributed on the holding company. 
This scheme’s intention is to achieve deduction of interest in Country B with non-inclusion of this interest in 
Country A. 
 
Diagram III: Deduction/non-inclusion (I) 
 
 
Scenario A: Country A is the surveyed country 
From the reports from Brazil and Colombia it is clear that the above case would not have the anticipated 
result of deduction on the one-hand and non-inclusion of interest on the other. As Brazilian and Colombian 
tax law does not provide for transparent partnerships, the assumptions in (vii) and (viii) above cannot be met 
and the case must fail.66 In other words, there can be no re-characterization of the income from the loan 
provided by the partnership to Subco B into income from equity. Therefore, a non-inclusion of the income 
from interest does not occur in Brazil and Colombia. 
                                                       
66 See Brazil report at 8 and Colombia report at 10. As further explained by Brazilians reporters, even silent partnerships in Brazil are 
subject to tax individually as separate legal entities. 
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Equally, this scheme cannot bring the desired outcome of deduction/non-inclusion of interest payments in 
Uruguay, because a partnership, which has a resident company as its partner, is not transparent for tax 
purposes and therefore the interest income of the partnership would be taxable at its level. Similar to Brazil 
and Colombia, the assumption under points (vii) and (viii) cannot be met and the case must fail.67 
 
The South African report indicates that the partnership will be transparent for South African tax purposes and 
therefore Subco A, who is its partner, will be treated as having received or accrued its share of the interest 
on the loan provided by the partnership to Subco B. Accordingly, the scheme will not work in South Africa as 
the income could not be re-characterised.  In South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal has confirmed68 
that the transparency of the partnership operates at the micro level (i.e. individual items of income and 
expenses accrue or are deductible by the individual partner in terms of their profit share) 69 rather than the 
macro level (where, for example, the profit would be separately determined and only the net result attributed 
to the partners.  While re-characterisation may take place where the transaction is considered a sham by the 
courts, 70 it is unlikely that this case (or the other constructs in this paper) are of the type to be considered 
sham transactions.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the report of South Africa includes, among others,71 a reference to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment of 12 and 20 May 2005 concerning the recoupment of allowances 
claimed in respect of a partnership asset on exit of a partner.72 The court confirmed in particular the 
operation of section 24H of the ITA (1962): what accrues to the individual partners is not a share of the 
taxable income of the partnership but rather a share of the gross income of the partnership against which the 
partner is allowed a deduction of attributable expenses and allowances. This includes the partner’s share of 
partnership expenses and allowances.73 It means that from the South African standpoint only the partner of a 
partnership, instead of the partnership itself, can deduct interest incurred by the partnership. This indirectly 
influences the effectiveness of the use of hybrid arrangements involving partnerships, such as the one 
discussed in this section. 
The Colombian reporter referred to the judgment of a lower court (the Tribunal Administrativo de 
Cundinamarca) of 23 November 2013 dealing indirectly with a hybrid mismatch. The judgment neither 
directly nor indirectly affects the effectiveness of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches, but may have an 
influence on the size of tax benefits resulting from it. The case concerned the valuation of a hybrid 
instrument at the time of the sale of said instrument. The tax administration wanted to apply equity valuation 
under the net book value method. The taxpayer argued that the instrument should be valued as debt which 
lowers a valuation of the hybrid instrument for tax purposes. The judgment was completely in favor of the 
                                                       
67 However, such income is foreign sourced and thus it will not be taxable in Uruguay. See Uruguay report at 10.  
68 Chipkin (Natal) (Pty) Ltd V Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, ([2005] 3 All SA 26 (SCA)) 67 SATC 243. 
69 See South Africa report at 20. 
70 It regards case law on “sham transaction” in which courts looked through the legal form of transaction by giving effect to the real 
transaction rather than its purported form. See, for example: Zandberg v Van Zyl, 1910 AD; Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith(Pty) Ltd And Another 
V Commissioner For Inland Revenue, 1996 (3) SA 942 (A), 58 SATC 229; Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles, Brothers & 
Hudson Ltd, 1941 AD; Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd, 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA); and Roshcon (Pty) 
Limited v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC and Others, (49/13) [2014] ZASCA 40; [2014] 2 All SA 654 (SCA); 2014 (4) SA 319 (SCA) (31 
March 2014).  
74 See Brazil report at 8 and Colombia report at 10. 
74 See Brazil report at 8 and Colombia report at 10. 
74 See Brazil report at 8 and Colombia report at 10. 
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taxpayers, as it holds that the tax administration has the obligation to take into account the limitations on the 
privileged stock as established by the taxpayer in the bylaws and issuance articles for class A stock. The 
judgment also recognized that the stock was issued more in the context of debt than as regular equity. It 
thus confirmed the taxpayers’ valuation and annulled the tax administration assessment. However, the 
judgment was appealed by the tax administration. The judgment ruling is expected in 2017.  
 
Scenario B: Country B is the surveyed country 
Where either Brazil or Colombia are the surveyed countries, the scheme could work with the desired result 
of the deduction in their countries and the non-inclusion assumed in a foreign country (Country A).74 
However, the Brazilian reporters cautioned that the Brazilian tax authorities may establish limitations to the 
interest deductibility of the subsidiary in Country B by applying transfer pricing and thin capitalization 
provisions.75 Moreover, the Administrative Board of Tax Appeals (CARF) in Brazil in its decisions have 
challenged interest deductibility in connection with loans that were deemed to have an equity nature based 
on the argument that these expenses were not considered as “necessary expenses”.76 As the reporter 
stated, the underlying rational influences the qualification of an instrument as debt or equity which, in turn, 
has an indirect impact on the effectiveness of schemes involving hybrid arrangements. 
 
The Uruguayan report suggests that this scheme cannot bring the expected outcome of deduction/non-
inclusion of interest payments. The Uruguayan subsidiary (Subco B) in this case will not be able to deduct 
the interest payments to the partnership. Interestingly the Uruguayan tax law does not allow for deductibility 
of interest payments made by a Uruguayan company if the payments do not constitute taxable income for 
the lender (a form of linking rule).77 Such domestic law speaks directly to this case, since the income from 
interest payments made by the Uruguayan subsidiary (Subco B) do not constitute taxable income to the 
partnership due to its tax transparency in Country A.78 Furthermore, the report shows that even if the income 
is taxable at the level of the partners, that is Subco A, the failure of this scheme remains unchanged as, from 
the perspective of the Uruguayan law, the partnership is the lender, not its partners. 
 
The South African report indicates that this case would be successful, but subject to certain limits.  To 
succeed, the interest paid by the South African subsidiary (Subco B) to the partnership together with other 
interest paid to non-resident connected persons and exempt bodies must not exceed 40 percent of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA),79 and the hybrid debt rules must not operate 
to deem the interest to be a dividend in specie.80 From a South African perspective, the case provides 
                                                       
74 See Brazil report at 8 and Colombia report at 10. 
75 See Brazil report at 8. 
76 According to the reporter, the arguments were as follows: “The same goals reached with the debt transaction could have been 
attained via equity (considering that the lender was the mother company of the borrower). This would point out the lack of necessity of 
the debt transaction”. See Decision of August 24 2009 in the Colgate case, Case No. 9101-00.287. In this decision, the interest 
deductibility was denied. “The necessity of the expenses should be analysed vis-à-vis the company’s trade or business.  In this regard, 
the acquisition of equity interest in another company would per se not qualify as a necessary expense”. See Unilever and PMPAR 
cases, in which the interest deductibility was accepted. 
77 Law 18,083, “regla candado”. See Uruguay report at 10. 
78 See assumption number (vii) above.  
79 Section 23M of the ITA (thin capitalization rule). 
80 Section 8F and 8FA of the ITA. 
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insufficient facts to conclude that the full deduction of the interest incurred by the South African subsidiary 
(Subco B) would be denied.81 
3.3.2.2 Deduction/ non-inclusion (II)82 
The following assumptions were made under the second case triggering deduction in one country with non-
inclusion in another: 
(i) a hybrid instrument that is treated as debt for tax purposes by the issuer’s jurisdiction and as equity for 
tax purposes by the holder’s jurisdiction; 
(ii) the issuer deducts the interest payments on the instrument for purposes of its home jurisdiction; 
(iii) the holder, receives income, qualified as dividend, that, pursuant to a participation exemption regime is 
not taxable in the country of the holder. Similar effects could also be reached under an imputation 
system as the income associated with the dividend on the instrument is sheltered by a tax credit. 
The desired result of this scheme is to deduct interest in the issuer Country and not include the interest as 
taxable income in the holder Country. 
 
Diagram IV: Deduction/non-inclusion (II) 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario A: Issuer Country is the surveyed country 
All surveyed countries’ reports suggest that their countries could be involved in such a scheme as issuer 
Country with the desired effects of deduction with non-inclusion, since the deduction in their countries will be 
possible, while non-inclusion in a foreign country (holder Country) is assumed. 
                                                       
81 See South Africa report at 17. 
82 Cf. “deduction/non-inclusion” with hybrid entity example in OECD (2012), supra n. 23, paragraphs 16-17 at pp. 8-9 and “Example 
1.1”. “See “interest payment under a debt/equity hybrid” in OECD (2015),  supra n. 12, p. 175. 
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In order to achieve the anticipated result in Colombia, the financial instrument should be carefully drafted to 
avoid a reclassification of dividends and interest under transfer pricing provisions, i.e. the loan contract 
should be drafted under terms complying with the arm’s length principle.83 
 
The Brazilian reporters underline that the scheme can be effective especially because of the fact that in 
Brazil the payment of interest on net equity (“juros sobre o capital próprio”, “JCP”) is treated as interest that 
constitutes a tax deductible expense, while other jurisdictions tend to regard it as dividends, since its 
payment is based on equity investment,84 which may fall within the participation exemption.85 Moreover, 
deduction with non-inclusion is also possible as a result of the tax/accounting mismatch regarding debt and 
equity instruments. The Brazilian tax law stipulates that expenses incurred in connection with debt 
instruments are deductible, even in the case where such debt instrument is registered as equity for 
accounting purposes (e.g. perpetual bonds). Conversely, the remuneration from equity instruments is not 
subject to taxation (equity treatment), despite treatment as debt for accounting purposes (e.g. redeemable 
preferred shares).86 
 
It may initially be concluded that deduction in one country with non-inclusion in the other may be achieved in 
the Uruguayan case if the interest is sourced in Uruguay and the lender (holder of the hybrid instrument) is 
taxable, even if not effectively taxed, on the interest payments received from the Uruguayan issuer of the 
debt instrument.87 However, the fact that the lender is eventually not effectively taxed on the income from 
payments received from Uruguay, due to their reclassification from interest into dividend and the applicability 
of the participation exemption, may change this outcome. Uruguayan tax law (“regla candado”) restricts the 
deductibility of interest paid by a Uruguay company to a foreign lender when the lender is not taxed on the 
interest received from Uruguay. 
 
The case may be met with some success in South Africa if cumulatively: (i) the hybrid instrument issued by 
the South African company does not qualify as a “hybrid debt instrument”;88 (ii) the interest thereon is not 
considered “hybrid interest” under South African tax law; (iii) and the proposed debt limitation rules of section 
23M of the ITA (1962) would not operate to limit the deduction in South Africa.89 
 
Scenario B: Holder Country is the surveyed country 
                                                       
83 See Colombia report at 10. 
84 For instance, the Spanish National Court (“Audiencia Nacional”) in its judgment of 27 February 2014 (Case No. 232/2011) classified t 
Brazilian interest on net equity as dividend under Spanish domestic law, based on its typical characteristic of a corporate right. Similarly, 
the German Federal Court of Finance (“Bundesfinanzhof”) in its judgment of 6 June 2012 (Case No. I R 6/11) characterized Brazilian 
interest on net equity as dividend both under German domestic law and the Brazil-Germany tax treaty. See R. Tomazela, Why Brazil’s 
interest on net equity should not be affected by BEPS Action 2, available online at: 
http://www.kluwertaxlawblog.com/blog/2015/08/26/why-brazils-interest-on-net-equity-should-not-be-affected-by-beps-action-2/. 
85 See Brazil report at 8.  
86 Id. 
87 See Uruguay report at 10. 
88 “Hybrid debt instrument” means “any instrument in respect of which a company owes an amount during a year of assessment if in 
terms of any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding (whether enforceable or not), including all steps therein or 
parts thereof, and includes any of the foregoing involving the alienation of property”. See section 8F in conjunction with section 80L of 
the ITA. 
89 See South Africa report at 17-18. 
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For Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay this scheme would achieve the desired effects of deduction with non-
inclusion where their countries act as the holder Country because their countries allow for non-inclusion, 
while deduction in a foreign country (issuer Country) is assumed.90  
 
By contrast, the envisaged scheme would be unlikely to succeed where South Africa was the holder Country 
in respect of full non-inclusion as a result of the participation exemption, because of one of the following 
reasons:91 (i) the amount in question is not treated as a dividend in the country of issue;92 (ii) the amount in 
question is deductible in the country of issue (a form of linking rule);93 or (iii) the amount is not payable in 
respect of an “equity share” as defined in section 1 of the Act (further proviso to section 10B of the ITA).94 
 
3.3.2.3 Deduction/ non-inclusion (III) 
The following assumptions were made under the third case triggering deduction in one country with non-
inclusion in the other: 
(i) a parent holds a subsidiary that is a hybrid entity. The subsidiary is treated as a separate corporation 
from the perspective of the Country of residence of its parent and as a transparent entity in its own 
Country of residence; 
(ii) the parent borrows money from the subsidiary, i.e. the subsidiary is the holder of the debt; 
(iii) the parent deducts the interest on the debt; 
(iv) the subsidiary does not include the interest in its income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram V: Deduction/non-inclusion (III) 
                                                       
90 See Brazil report at 8; Colombia report at 10; and Uruguay report at 10. 
91 See South Africa report at 18. 
92 Section 10B(2) of the ITA read with the definition of “foreign dividend” in section 1 of the ITA. 
93 Proviso to section 10B of the ITA. 
94An “equity share” means “any share in a company excluding any share that, neither as respects dividends nor as respects returns of 
capital, carries any right to participate beyond a specified amount in the distribution.” 
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Scenario A: Holder of the debt (the subsidiary) is resident in the surveyed Country 
The reporters of all surveyed countries, apart from an unlikely scenario in South Africa, said that their 
countries could not be involved in such scheme as Country of the debt’s holder (Country of the subsidiary).95 
It stems from the lack of tax provisions allowing for a tax transparent treatment of a domestic company in the 
said countries.  
 
In South Africa this scheme would only be successful if the subsidiary were classified as either a partnership 
or a branch of the parent entity. As both such entities are tax transparent for South African tax purposes, the 
income on the note would not comprise an amount received or accrued by such partnership or branch and 
accordingly would not be subject to tax in South Africa.96 Furthermore, if the partnership or the branch 
constituted a PE, profits of which could be taxed in South Africa, the PE would recognize interest income (if 
considered attributable to the PE) in this scenario rendering it inapplicable.  
 
Scenario B: Issuer of the debt (the parent) is resident of the surveyed Country 
In this scenario, the reporters of Brazil and Colombia concluded that this scheme could work in their 
jurisdictions, while the opposite was said by the reporters of South Africa and Uruguay.97 
 
While the scheme could bring the desired outcome of deduction with non-inclusion in Brazil, the possibility 
exists that the success may be limited by the Brazilian transfer pricing and thin capitalization provisions. 
Furthermore, on application of the Brazilian CFC rules by tax authorities, the interest income of the 
subsidiary would be subject to Brazilian taxation at the current basis, thus reducing the appeal of the scheme. 
The Colombian reporter did not note any risks with this scheme and, in the absence of any CFC rules in 
force, the interest income earned by the subsidiary would not be taxed in Colombia. 
 
                                                       
95 See Brazil report at 9; Colombia report at 11; South Africa report at 19; and Uruguay report at 11. 
96 See South Africa report at 18. 
97 See Brazil report at 9; Colombia report at11; South Africa report at 18; and Uruguay report at 11. 
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In Uruguay the scheme will not achieve anticipated results because the interest payments made by the 
Uruguayan parent will not be deductible due to the lack of their taxation in the country of the recipient (a form 
of linking rule). 
 
The scheme fails in South Africa because the foreign subsidiary would be considered a “foreign partnership”.  
Such classification would result in the subsidiary being treated as tax transparent for South African tax law 
purposes. The South African parent would therefore not be able to deduct the interest on the loan to the 
extent of its share of the partnership. 
 
3.3.2.4 Interim conclusions in respect to the effectiveness of deduction with no inclusion schemes 
To summarise this results from the case studies focussing on deduction in one country with no inclusion of 
income in the other country: in case (I) Scenario A, the scheme could not achieve the desired result in any of 
the surveyed countries, apart from South Africa. The lack of success is generally attributable to the general 
tax law provisions in each of the countries. However, in Scenario B, the scheme may be successful in both 
Brazil and Colombia because of the lack of anti-hybrid rules. This scheme will not be successful in South 
Africa and Uruguay, however, since the former country may apply its anti-hybrid rules, while the latter 
country relies on a general rule (“regla candado”) that interest payments made by a Uruguayan company are 
not deductible if they do not constitute taxable income for the lender. 
 
For case (II) Scenario A, successful application of such a scheme was possible in Brazil, Colombia, and 
Uruguay due to the lack of anti-hybrid rules. The successful outcome in Brazil is assisted further by rules 
stipulating that a payment of interest on net equity is tax deductible. However, from a tax policy point of view, 
the Brazilian tax provisions regulating interest on net equity should not be perceived as facilitating tax 
avoidance via hybrid mismatches.  These rules mainly constitute a legal mechanism created by the Brazilian 
legislator to achieve tax policy objectives important for economic growth in Brazil.98 In South Africa, the effect 
of the scheme could be struck down either by anti-hybrid debt instrument rules or under the debt limitation 
rules of section 23M of the ITA (1962). Similarly for Scenario B the scheme could be effective in Brazil, 
Colombia, and Uruguay because anti-hybrid rules do not exist or cannot be applied.  In South Africa, the 
anti-hybrid rules may prevent the scheme from being successful.  
 
Finally, case (III) in Scenario A was unlikely to apply in any of the surveyed countries.  In a limited 
application, the scheme could yield a positive outcome in South Africa, should the entity qualify as a 
partnership.  As a partnership is tax transparent, its income would not comprise an amount received or 
accrued by the partnership, which is critical to cause the desired result of deduction with non-inclusion. For 
Scenario B, the scheme can be effective in Brazil and Colombia, again due to the lack of anti-hybrid rules. It 
will not be effective in relation to Uruguay, since interest is not deductible at the level of the Uruguayan 
                                                       
98 It regards “the following tax policy objectives: “(i) to mitigate the effects of the distinction between equity and debt, thus reducing the 
debt bias; (ii) to encourage the capitalization of Brazilian companies through formal capital contribution, in order to prevent leveraging 
and excessive level of indebtedness; (iii) to integrate corporate and individual income taxes, for the purposes of eliminating double 
taxation of corporate profits; (iv) to alleviate the undesirable effects of the prohibition on monetary adjustment of financial statements in 
a context of high inflation.” See Tomazela, R., Why Brazil’s interest on net equity should not be affected by BEPS Action 2, available 
online at: http://www.kluwertaxlawblog.com/blog/2015/08/26/why-brazils-interest-on-net-equity-should-not-be-affected-by-beps-action-
2/. 
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company whenever it is paid to an entity that is not taxable on such payments. In the case of South Africa, 
the lack of the said effectiveness stems from the general tax treatment of income derived by South African 
companies via foreign partnerships and interest incurred by such partnerships.99 
 
3.3.3 Tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches: country perspectives 
3.3.3.1 Illustrative tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches exposed in the surveyed countries 
Apart from two publicized transactions in Colombia, there have been no decided or publicly exposed cases 
in the other surveyed countries concerning tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches.100 (The first Colombian 
transaction considered the sale of the largest brewery in Colombia (Bavaria) from the Colombian family 
(Santo Domingo) to South African SABMiller. The sale was achieved through the use of a hybrid entity and a 
hybrid transfer, i.e. a transfer that is treated as a sale for the purposes of one jurisdiction while it is not 
treated as a sale for the other jurisdiction. The Santo Domingo Group contributed their shares in Bavaria (the 
Colombian target) to a Delaware LLC (BevCo Sub LLC), as part of a plan for a merger with Racetrack LLC, 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) owned by SABMiller. The BevCo Sub LLC was a hybrid entity, as it made 
the election to be treated as a partnership under US check-the-box rules. After the Santo Domingo interest in 
Bavaria had been transferred to BevCo Sub LLC, Racetrack LLC absorbed BevCo Sub LLC in a forward 
triangular merger. For Colombian purposes, the whole transaction including the contribution of shares to 
BevCo Sub LLC was viewed as a merger, while the US viewed the contribution as a taxable contribution.  
The US classification allowed for a step-up in the basis (costs) of Bavaria shares for the buyer (Racetrack 
LLC owned by SABMiller). While politicians and the media denounced that no taxes had been paid and 
requested that the transaction be treated as a sale, the same effect could have been achieved by other 
means. At the time of the transaction, the Santo Domingo Group shares in Bavaria could have been 
transferred at book value to a foreign company without tax consequences.  Therefore, even if the transaction 
was treated as a sale, the taxable income would have remained zero despite the transaction value being 
USD 4 billion.  
 
Despite public outcry over the lack of taxation in Colombia (led in in 2007 by a Congressman) the transaction 
was confirmed to have not violated any laws in Colombia. Furthermore, since the merger took place outside 
of Colombia, taxation in Colombia was precluded due to the territoriality principle. Legislative amendments 
followed (motivated in part by this transaction) requiring that the transfer of assets to a foreign jurisdiction 
was to take place at arm’s length in terms of the transfer pricing rules effectively triggering an exit tax in 
Colombia.  
 
The second publicized transaction in Colombia concerned a mining company resident in Switzerland.  This 
company (the parent company) started a tax planning scheme to take advantage of a hybrid mismatch.  The 
parent company in Switzerland formed a company in a tax haven (the tax haven company) funded with USD 
1000. The tax haven company then obtained a loan for over 1 million USD, which was to be loaned to the 
Colombian subsidiary of the Swiss company (also its parent company). The interest to be received by the tax 
                                                       
99 The South African parent will not be able to deduct the interest on the loan to the extent of its share of the partnership. 
100 See Brazil report at 10; Colombia report at 11-12; South Africa report at 219; and Uruguay report at 11. 
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haven company would be exempt in the tax haven and the Colombian highly profitable subsidiary would 
claim an interest deduction, reducing its corporate income tax in Colombia. This scheme would have 
achieved the aim of deduction in one jurisdiction with non-inclusion in another. The tax haven company was 
classified as a hybrid entity in that jurisdiction (this is how the tax haven could obtain the loan with such small 
equity as the loan was made with reference to the assets of the parent company), but as opaque by the 
parent company in Switzerland.  The interest was therefore not taxed in Switzerland.  
 
When the Colombian company attempted to register the foreign debt with the Central Bank, the head of the 
tax administration was made aware. The tax administration director appeared in the media stating that this 
was a case of gross tax avoidance, and presented the case as an example to justify the existence of the 
Colombian GAAR. The Colombian company withdrew the application for the registration of the debt and the 
parent company in Switzerland liquidated the company in the tax haven. 
 
3.3.3.2 Hypothetical tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches schemes in the surveyed countries 
All reporters depicted schemes of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches that potentially could take place in 
their countries.101 
 
Two schemes were suggested in the Brazilian report. The first involves the use of Austrian debentures and 
utilising the Brazil-Austria tax treaty.  Under this treaty, dividends paid from Austria to a Brazilian company 
are exempt from taxation in Brazil if the Brazilian company owns at least 25 percent of the share capital of 
the Austrian company paying the dividend (the participation exemption).102 Furthermore, Art. 10(4) of the 
Brazil-Austria tax treaty includes in the meaning of “income from dividends” “jouissance” shares or 
“jouissance” rights. According to Austrian law, some “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights are treated as 
debt for domestic purposes, for example debentures, thus qualifying as a deductible expense. Consequently, 
where a Brazilian company which has more than 25 percent of the shares in an Austrian company and 
receives dividends from debentures in Austria, a deduction in Austria with non-inclusion in Brazil arises.  
 
The second suggested scheme involves interest on net equity and utilization of discrepancies between tax 
and accounting treatment of financial instruments.103 This scheme also achieves the deduction with non-
inclusion outcome.  
 
The Colombian reporter indicated a possible scheme which, thorough the use of deep-in-the-money share 
options, to have the transaction treated as a sale in a foreign jurisdiction (mostly in US and some countries in 
Europe) without triggering the exit tax in Colombia. The person holding a deep-in-the-money option in the 
foreign country would be treated as owning the underlying shares, while Colombia would only see a sale 
(with the corresponding tax) when the holder exercises the right granted by the option causing the hybrid 
mismatch. Only if there are no benefits other than tax benefits in the granting of the option on the Colombian 
shares could this scheme be considered as tax avoidance that may trigger an application of the Colombian 
                                                       
101 See Brazil report at 10; Colombia report at 12; South Africa report at 22; and Uruguay report at 11. 
102 See Art. 23(2) Brazil-Austria tax treaty. 
103 Cf. section 3.3.2.2 above in Scenario A. 
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GAAR. Another hybrid mismatch arrangement makes use of the differences in the qualification of leasing 
contracts. The lease payments can be fully deducted in the lessee’s country of residence, Colombia, without 
excluding the portion attributable to capital. The lessor who is resident in State A only includes the interest 
portion as income in State A. 
 
In Uruguay dividends received by a Uruguayan company from foreign companies will not be taxed in 
Uruguay due to the fact that they constitute income of a foreign source. Provided that such dividends are 
treated as interest deductible in countries from which they are paid to the Uruguayan company, the scheme 
may lead to deduction with non-inclusion. 
 
In South Africa, where a South African resident taxpayer holds a debt instrument issued by a non-resident 
and the legal form of this instrument is a debt according to the law of a non-resident state but treated as 
equity under South African law and therefore the instrument qualifies as a hybrid debt instrument the South 
African resident is deemed to accrue a dividend in specie instead of interest. This income then qualifies as 
exempt income in the hands of the holder (the South African resident), while potentially remaining available 
as a deduction in the hands of the recipient (the non-resident). Accordingly, the scheme brings deduction 
with non-inclusion.  
 
3.3.3.3  Differences between tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches carried out by multinational 
corporations and high net worth individuals in the surveyed countries 
The reporter of Uruguay indicated that there are no differences between tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
carried out by multinational corporations and high net worth individuals in that country.104 Likewise for the 
Brazilian reporters. Albeit in the Brazilian report it is indicated that some differences may appear because of 
the fact that the Brazilian CFC rules are only applicable to companies.105 Thus hybrid mismatch schemes 
involving Brazilian individuals can bring more effective results than those with Brazilian companies. The 
same can be said in relation to Uruguayan companies, since the Uruguay CFC rules are only applicable to 
Uruguayan individuals.106  
 
For both South Africa107 and Colombia, there is lack of information to stratify the taxpayers currently involved 
in tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. The Colombian reporter, however, interestingly said that there is 
certainly a higher chance of large multinationals being audited than high net worth individuals, as the 
additional reporting obligations required from multinationals make it easier for the tax administration to 
discover arbitrage when Colombia is the residence state.108 This finding implies that even though there is a 
lack of data allowing for determining differences between tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches carried out by 
Colombian multinational corporations and high net worth individuals, it is more likely that such arbitrage will 
be detected in future in relation to companies rather than to individuals. This leads us to a general 
conclusion that neutralizing effects of hybrid mismatches seems to be more effective with respect to 
                                                       
104 See Uruguay report at 11. 
105 See Brazil report at 10. 
106 The South African CFC rules may not cause the said difference, since they apply to both South African individuals and companies. In 
Colombia, in turn, there are no CFC rules in force. 
107 See South Africa report at 22. 
108 See Colombia report at 12. 
  
27 
companies than individuals, because there are generally more reporting obligations stemming from tax rules 
for companies in comparison to individuals. 
 
3.3.3.4 Revenue effects of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches on tax systems of the surveyed 
countries 
Reporters of all the surveyed countries said that they are not aware of any data measuring the impact of tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches on revenue effects in their countries.109 Regardless of the perceived 
importance of the issue of hybrid mismatches in each of the countries, no measure of the impact of tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches on revenue has been publicly disclosed. In any event, measurement of this 
nature may be very difficult to accurately determine both for the countries in this study and in general.110 
 
3.4 Current and prospective domestic and tax treaty provisions and practice against tax arbitrage 
via hybrid mismatches 
3.4.1 Domestic anti-hybrid rules and other provisions relevant to prevent tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches 
Legislative intervention to prevent hybrid mismatches varies across the countries surveyed ranging from the 
most in South Africa, less in Uruguay and Colombia, and least in Brazil.111 Only the South African legislation 
embeds explicit restrictions to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. The analysis of the domestic anti-hybrid 
rules begins, therefore, with this country’s legislation. 
 
According to the South African reporter, the following tax law provisions are considered to explicitly target tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches: (i) sections 8E, 8EA, 8F and 8FA of the ITA (1962) concerning hybrid 
instruments; (ii) proviso to section 10B of the ITA (1962) stipulating that the participation exemption does not 
apply to foreign dividends which can be deducted for tax purposes in a foreign jurisdiction; (iii) paragraph 80 
of the 8th Schedule to the ITA (1962) regulating exemption from capital gains vested by a trust; (iv) section 1 
of the ITA (1962) stating that “any person other than a natural person” is not resident of South Africa if the 
person is a resident of another county in terms of any tax treaty ratified by South Africa; (iv) provisions 
excluding “foreign partnerships” as defined from the scope of taxable “companies”112 and section 24J(1) of 
the ITA (1962) allowing for treatment of repurchase agreements and resale agreements as interest bearing 
financial arrangements. Moreover, sections 8F, 8FA, 24J of the ITA (1962) (in respect of resale agreements) 
and the definition of “company” and “person” (in respect of “foreign partnerships”) operate as re-
characterisation provisions. Substance over form would appear to be the main driver of the re-
characterisation provisions of section 8E, 8EA, 8F and 8FA, while linkage would appear to be the main driver 
of the denial of the application of participation exemption to foreign dividends which are treated as tax 
deductible expenses in the foreign jurisdiction. 
                                                       
109 See Brazil report at 12; Colombia report at 14; South Africa report at 27; and Uruguay report at 13. 
110 See infra part 3. 
111 See Brazil report at 11; Colombia report at 12; South Africa report at 22-24; and Uruguay report at 12. 
112 They are therefore treated as transparent for these purposes, see J. Hattingh, South Africa – Corporate Taxation, IBFD Tax 
Research Platform, at 1.1.4. 
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In Uruguay the tax provision stipulating that only interest constituting taxable income for the taxpayer 
receiving the interest is deductible (law 18,083, “regla candado”), may be perceived an anti-hybrid rule. The 
reporter also states that the Uruguayan CFC rules,113 GAAR including a substance over form approach, and 
the restrictions on the deduction of expenses providing that only the necessary expenses properly 
documented can be tax deductible, may be considered as having an impact on tax arbitrage through hybrid 
mismatches. The territorial tax system of Uruguay has similar impact since interest paid by a foreign branch 
of a Uruguayan company is not deductible in Uruguay, i.e. income of that branch is not included in the tax 
return of the Uruguayan company, but equally neither are the expenses of that. Beyond that, there are 
neither re-characterisation provisions nor provisions specifically dealing with cross-border tax arbitrage via 
hybrid mismatches. 
 
In Colombia the transfer pricing provisions and the GAAR can target tax arbitrage through hybrid 
mismatches. The transfer pricing provisions are also considered re-characterisation provisions, since they 
allow the Colombian tax authorities to re-characterise interest into dividends. The effect is that any deduction 
will be denied whenever interest transactions are deemed as non-compliant with arm’s length conditions (a 
form of thin capitalization rule). In any case, however, neither transfer pricing provisions nor the GAAR are 
specifically aimed against cross-border tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. 
 
Finally, the Brazilian reporters indicated that irrespective of the lack of a GAAR and specific anti-hybrid rules 
in the Brazilian tax law, the thin capitalization rules, limiting the interest deductibility to a debt-equity 
threshold of 2:1 debt-equity, can affect tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. Furthermore, the Administrative 
Board of Tax Appeals applies the business purpose doctrine to analyse whether tax planning structures are 
valid. In a case of hybrid mismatches, though, the reporters believed that more relevant than the business 
purpose doctrine is the doctrine of substance over form. That seems to be the underlying rational in the 
Colgate case.114 The Brazilian reporters added that although CFC rules are applied in specific situations in 
most countries as anti-tax avoidance rules, in Brazil the CFC rules are applicable to all foreign investment 
held by Brazilian companies. These rules are therefore not seen as an anti-tax avoidance control from a 
Brazilian perspective, but as integral to the Brazilian Income Tax system. In any case, the currently worded 
CFC rules in Brazil can prevent tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches regarding the use of foreign branches by 
their Brazilian head offices.115 
 
                                                       
113 According to these rules, resident individuals obtaining income from dividends, interest and all income derived from capital factor 
generated abroad via a CFC, the income will be taxed at the level of the individual, i.e. a separate tax personality of a CFC is 
disregarded. Therefore these rules are called in Uruguay “fiscal transparency rules” (reglas de transparencia fiscal). 
114See Decision of August 24 2009, Case No. 9101-00.287. 
115 The Brazilian CFC rules allow to attribute an income of a foreign branch to its Brazilian head office, while the interest expense of that 
branch cannot be deducted from the Brazilian head office’s income (i.e. head office is taxed for the gross income of the PE). These 
rules therefore permit to prevent double deductions and deduction with no inclusion in said cases. Cf. supra 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.3. 
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3.4.1.1 Tax inspector guidelines/rulings and administrative rulings as opportunity for arbitrage 
The reporters of all surveyed countries admitted that even if it may be potentially possible that tax rulings or 
administrative guidelines can create opportunities for tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches, none of the 
reporters were aware of such rulings or guidelines.116  
 
Interestingly, even in South Africa, where the perception of tax arbitrage through hybrid entities is high and 
certain anti-hybrid rules are in force, no guidelines and only one Binding Private Ruling has since been 
issued by the South African Revenue Service.117 One may assume that even tax authorities applying anti-
hybrid rules are not aware of the structure and reasons for the functioning of hybrid arrangements to an 
extent sufficient to prepare an adequate and clear guideline on this issue.118 
 
3.4.1.2 Current and rejected proposals for anti-hybrid rules 
The reports of all surveyed countries show that there are no current proposals aimed at countering tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches that are likely to be approved in the near future.119 The Colombian tax 
administration is reported to be unaware of the tax avoidance possibilities stemming from hybrid mismatches 
in most cases. In South African and Uruguay no successful attempts to counteract the such mismatches 
have been taken. Lastly, in Brazil, the debate to repeal the deductibility of interest on net equity’s provisions 
was unsuccessful. 
 
3.4.1.3 Tax treaty provisions countering tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
None of the reports mention the existence of tax treaty provisions that could counter tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches explicitly, 120 but some do impact such mismatches implicitly. 
 
For Brazil, the interest on net equity’s provision under the interest article of some Brazilian tax treaties may 
implicitly have the effect, in the residence state, of preventing the classification of interest as dividends.121 
                                                       
116 See Brazil report at 11; Colombia report at 13; South Africa report at 24; and Uruguay report at 12. 
117 1 of March 2016, BPR 225. This ruling determines the dividends tax consequences for a non-resident issuer of hybrid debt 
instruments. The ruling as available online at: http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Rulings/LAPD-IntR-R-BPR-2016-10%20-
%20BPR225%20Hybrid%20debt%20instruments.pdf. 
118 In that regard, the German experience with its anti-hybrid rule on dual consolidated losses is instructive, i.e. the German Dual 
Consolidated Loss Rule of section 14 No. 5 of the German Corporate Tax Act (Körperschaftsteuergesetz), version dated 15 October 
2002, BGBl. I 2002 at 4144, last amended 2 November 2015, BGBl. I 2015 at 1834, see A. Perdelwitz, Germany - Corporate Taxation - 
Country Analyses, IBFD Tax Research Platform, Last Reviewed: 9 December 2016, p. 15. This rule says that “Losses of a controlling 
entity or a controlled entity in a German tax consolidated group are disallowed for German tax purposes to the extent such losses are 
taken into account  for foreign tax purposes at the level  of the controlling entity, the  controlled entity or any  other person.” [translation 
after: Deloitte, Scope of dual consolidated loss rules broadened, Germany Tax Alert, 13 March, 2013, available online at: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-germany-110313.pdf]. Although this rule was for the 
first time introduced to the German tax law with effect from 2001, it had reportedly never been applied by the German tax 
administration. From the beginning there was a lack of clarity about the rule’s potential content. The tax administration for more than ten 
years had neither managed to issue any explanatory guideline on its application nor provided a box for an entry in the official tax return 
forms. See J. Lüdicke, The BEPS Work on Hybrid Mismatches – Selected Issues in R. Danon (ed.), Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS): The Impact for European and international tax policy, (Schulthess: 2016), pp. 54-56. Regardless of this perceived flaw in 
potential application of this anti-hybrid rule, the OECD mentioned this rule in the 2012 Report on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements as one 
of the few examples of an anti-hybrid rule existing currently in the legislation of the OECD Member State. This implies that without even 
briefly indicating the lack of its application in Germany and the lack of clarity of its content, the OECD recommends other countries to 
consider following the German example. See OECD (2012), supra n. 23, paragraph 39 at p. 15,  
119 See Brazil report at 12; Colombia report at 13-14; South Africa report at 24-25; and Uruguay report at 12. 
120 See Brazil report at 12; Colombia report at 14; South Africa report at 25-26; and Uruguay report at 12. 
121 In fact, the interest on net equity provision is included usually in the protocols to some of the Brazilian tax treaties, which constitute 
parts of the previously concluded treaties, e.g. they modify/supplement the equivalents of Article 11 (interest) OECD MC of the Brazilian 
  
30 
However, such provision in the treaty may have “no effect”122 over the domestic law of the residence state 
which seems to be the case based on the interpretation of, for example, the Brazil-Netherlands tax treaty. 
Moreover, the Brazilian treaty network typically includes a provision according to which the treatment under 
the interest article should be similar to the treatment given by the domestic law of the state of source (i.e. the 
state from which the interest is paid out).123 This may reduce the opportunities for using hybrid mismatches 
resulting in deduction with non-inclusion.  In such cases the treatment of payments in the source state as 
interest will trigger the analogous treatment of such payments in the state of residence of their recipients, 
preventing the application of the participation exemption for these payments (provided that the exemption 
under domestic laws applies exclusively to dividends and that the treaty qualification is binding for domestic 
purposes). 
 
In Colombian tax treaties the only provision that may potentially affect tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches is 
the “main business purpose” provision within the LOB clauses. 
 
The reporter of Uruguay indicates that only beneficial ownership clauses of treaty provisions are likely to be 
applied against tax arbitrage through hybrid mismatches. Whereas in South Africa, treaties stipulating that 
instances of dual residence for persons other than individuals124 shall be resolved by mutual agreement may 
be a limiting factor to mismatches. 
 
3.4.1.4 Penalties for tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
In Uruguay125 and Colombia, until 2015, no penalties have been in force. However, in Colombia since 2015, 
the Minister of Finance announced that he intends to introduce criminal liability for tax avoidance. This tax 
reform was postponed until the third quarter of 2016 and even if approved will only enter into force in 2017. 
 
In Brazil, penalties may be imposed on taxpayers if the tax authorities disagree with the interpretation of tax 
law applied by taxpayers that result in avoiding taxation. This means that if the tax authorities challenge a tax 
benefit arising from hybrid mismatches, penalties will be charged in addition to the principal amount. By 
contrast, in a case in which it is decided that the tax planning involving a hybrid arrangement is valid, no 
penalty applies.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
treaties. These additional protocols expressly indicate that the interest on net equity constitutes interest under Article 11(2), see, for 
example, Article 1 (a.2(b)) of the Protocol regulated by the Treasury Ministry Ordinance 28 of 2002 to the treaty with Portugal (2000); 
Article 1 (a.2(b)) of the Protocol regulated by Treasury Ministry Ordinance 285 of 2003 to the treaty with Chile (2001); and Article 1 (2) 
of the Protocol regulated by Treasury Ministry Ordinance 38 of 2007 to the treaty with Mexico (2003). In general, the treaties concluded 
by Brazil before 1990 adopt the definition of interest found in the 1967 OECD MC, which extends the definition of interest as referred by 
the domestic legislation of the source country, see, for example, Article 10(4) of the treaty with Japan (1967) and Article 11 of the treaty 
with Austria (1976). This means the under such treaties the interest on net equity qualifies as interest in so far Brazil is the source 
country of the interest. 
122 By “no effect” Brazilian reporters mean that interest and dividends are subject to the same tax burden in the residence state. Interest 
on Net Equity (“INE”) is a hybrid instrument in the sense that it is treated for tax purposes as interest in some countries (e.g. Brazil) and 
as dividend in other countries. Accordingly, in the Brazilian report we mean by “effect” a beneficial tax treatment on foreign dividends in 
comparison to the tax treatment of foreign interest received from Brazil. Specifically in regards to the Brazil-Netherlands tax treaty, it is 
stated that this provision may have no effect if the Dutch tax burden is the same on foreign dividends and interest. 
123 It reflects the Avery Jones’s approach called “the new approach” and currently applying mostly in the field of solving problems of 
qualification conflicts under distributive rules. See to this effect J. F. Avery Jones, et al., The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with 
Particular Reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model—I, British Tax Review 1 (1984), p. 50; J-M, Déry and D. Ward, Canada in 
Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions, (IFA Cahiers Vol. 78a, 1993), p. 281, Online Books IBFD. See Commentary on Article 
23 A and B, paragraphs 32.1-32.3. 
124 And in case of the treaties with Bulgaria, Canada, and US, in case of persons other than individuals and companies. 
125 See Uruguay report at 13. 
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Finally, the South African reporter indicated that taxpayers involved in a hybrid arrangement will not be 
subject to penalties if they fully and properly disclose this arrangement, unless it results in an 
understatement126 of South African taxes. It means that penalties can be imposed on a taxpayer only if the 
outcome of a hybrid mismatch arrangement results either from tax evasion or understatement. 
 
3.5 Current and potential reaction of the surveyed countries to OECD inputs within the BEPS 
Project 
Even though none of the surveyed countries is (yet) a member of the OECD, they do cooperate with the 
OECD although to different extents.127 Thus the OECDs inputs may influence shaping their tax systems, 
including issues related to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. The reactions to these inputs, however, vary 
among the countries. 
 
Brazil and South Africa participate in the BEPS Project through their membership of the G20 and being a 
signatories to the Declaration on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting as adopted at a meeting of the OECD 
Council at Ministerial Level on 29-30 May 2013.128 
In May 2013, the OECD Council launched accession discussions with Colombia and this country is currently 
completing the proceedings to become an official member of the OECD. This country is also a member of 
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, the OECD’s Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), and BEPS’ Working Party 6.129 
 
                                                       
126 An understatement of South African taxes means: “any prejudice to SARS or the fiscus as a result of (i) a default in rendering a 
return; (ii) an omission from a return; (iii) an incorrect statement in a return; or (iv) if no return is required, the failure to pay the correct 
amount of ‘tax’.” See section 221 of the Tax Administration Act 2011 (Act No. 28 of 2011). 
127  Brazil and Colombia are also member of the Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations (Centro Interamericano de 
Administraciones Tributarias, “CIAT”). However, in the opinion of the reporters, this forum is extremely hermetic and therefore there is 
no information available on whether tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches were dealt within its functioning. 
128  See this document online at:  
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C/MIN%282013%2922/FINAL&docLanguage=En. Brazil and 
South Africa are two among five of the so-called BRICS counties that were invited by the OECD in 2007 to introduce a strengthened 
cooperation through “Enhanced Engagement” programmes and therefore they are considered to be the Key Partners that contribute to 
the OECD’s work in a sustained and comprehensive manner also in respect of other issues than the way tax authorities supervise their 
taxpayers. OECD, Members and partners, available online at: http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/. The enhanced 
cooperation between the OECD and BRICS counties is fully understandable and justified, since it is estimated that economies of the 
latter countries could overtake the combined GDP of the G7 nations by 2027. See R. Foroohar, BRICs Overtake G7 By 2027, 
Newsweek Business, available online at: http://europe.newsweek.com/brics-overtake-g7-2027-76001?rm=eu. BRIC is an acronym first 
used by Jim O’Neill in a 2001 paper entitled Building Better Global Economic BRICSs, Global Economics Paper No: 66, available online 
at: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf. BRIC refers to the countries of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, which are all deemed to be at a similar stage of newly advanced economic development. This acronym has come into 
widespread use as a symbol of the shift in global economic power away from the developed G7 economies towards the developing 
world, see K. Beth, For Mr. BRIC, nations meeting a milestone, CNNMoney.com, available online at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/17/news/economy/goldman_sachs_jim_oneill_interview.fortune/index.htm. Since 14 April 2011 BRIC is 
to be known as BRICS due to the new membership of South Africa. See more online at: http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/brics-
080411.htm#ixzz2elKqwksC. 
129 Working Party 6  deals with Taxation of Multinational Enterprises in relation to part of Action 4 (Limit Base Erosion via Interest 
Deductions and Other Financial Payments), Actions 8 (Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line With Value Creation / 
Intangibles), 9 (Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line With Value Creation / Risks and Capital), 10 (Assure that Transfer 
Pricing Outcomes are in Line With Value Creation / Other High-Risk Transactions), and 13 (Re-examine Transfer Pricing 
Documentation). See OECD, About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), available online at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
about.htm. 
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Although Uruguay is only a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes, this Forum significantly influences the tax policy of this country. It convinced Uruguay to sign 
several tax treaties and tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and soften bank secrecy privilege.130 
 
Of all surveyed countries, Brazil and South Africa would seem the most likely candidates to follow the 
BEPS’s work regarding the neutralization of the outcome of hybrid arrangements.131 However, reports of 
Brazil and South Africa imply that these countries see more potential in neutralizing hybrid arrangements’ 
outcomes via domestic law than via tax treaties,132 not  least because amending the treaties would likely be 
a time consuming and lengthy process.133 Moreover, all surveyed countries agreed that the ambulatory 
interpretation of tax treaties cannot be a proper solution for solving problems caused by tax arbitrage via 
hybrid mismatches134 either because their courts do not use such interpretational approach, as in the case of 
Colombia,135 or as it is far from clear whether or not the courts will use such interpretation, like in South 
Africa.136 
 
3.6 Policy Perspectives 
3.6.1 The feasibility of the introduction of the OECD policy recommendations contained in the 
BEPS Action Plan 2 in the surveyed countries 
The analysis of the policy perspectives of the surveyed developing countries towards the prevention of tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches commences with reporting their views on the feasibility of the selected 
policy recommendations contained in the BEPS Action Plan 2. This regards the following three 
recommendations: (i) introduction of specific tax treaty provisions aimed at ensuring that hybrid instruments 
and entities (including dual resident entities) are not used to unduly obtain treaty benefits;137 (ii) introduction 
of domestic law provisions aimed at preventing exemption or non-recognition for payments that are 
deductible by the payer;138 and (iii) introduction of domestic law provisions aimed at denying a deduction for 
a payment that is also deductible in another jurisdiction.139 
 
3.6.1.1 Introduction of specific tax treaty provisions aimed at ensuring that hybrid instruments and 
entities (including dual resident entities) are not used to unduly obtain treaty benefits 
The Brazilian reporters indicated that some provisions of the tax treaties ratified by Brazil, such as LOB 
clauses and anti-abuse clauses allowing tax authorities to deny treaty benefits stemming from Arts. 10, 11 
                                                       
130 As of October 2015, Uruguay was rated by the Global Forum as largely compliant with the OECD standard for exchange of 
information on request (EOIR). See OECD, Tax Transparency 2015 Report on Progress, available online at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/global-forum-annual-report-2015.pdf, p. 15. 
131 See, however, different levels of perception of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in Brazil and South Africa supra 3.2, and different 
stage of developments of domestic tax law aimed against this phenomenon between these countries supra 3.4.1. 
132 See Brazil report at 13 and South Africa Report at 28. 
133 In that regard, the Brazilian reporters cautioned that domestic anti-hybrid rules may be perceived as treaty override. See Brazil report 
at 13. 
134 See Brazil report at 13 and South Africa Report at 28. 
135 See Colombia report at 15. 
136 See South Africa report at 28. 
137 I.e., the change to Art. 4(3) of the OECD MTC to solve the problem of dual resident entities in a way that cases of dual treaty 
residence would be solved on a case-by-case basis by tax authorities of contracting states upon the mutual agreement rather than on 
the basis of the current rule based on place of effective management of entities. See (OECD 2015), supra n. 12, pp. 137-138. 
138 Id., pp. 23-65 and 83-91. 
139 Id., pp. 66-82. 
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and 12,140 can potentially be applied to ensure that hybrid instruments are not used to unduly obtain treaty 
benefits.141 They added, however, that such provisions do not seem to effectively target the issues at hand, 
since they are generic and have no clear interpretation. Therefore, the reporters suggest a bifurcated 
approach to deal with hybrid mismatches under tax treaties. This issue should be first addressed by 
domestic anti-hybrid rules, since most hybrid mismatches arise from the domestic laws of different countries, 
and then the treaties’ provisions should be generic enough to allow the domestic anti-hybrid rules to apply. 
Secondly, in cases where the hybrid mismatches arise in connection with diverging interpretations of the 
treaty itself by the state of residence and the state of source, they suggested that Art. 3(2) MC OECD should 
be amended so that the interpretation of the state of source should prevail. This solution is already in force in 
the Brazilian tax treaties under the interest article142 and could be extended to all other distributive rules by 
the suggested change of equivalents of Art. 3(2) MC OECD in the Brazilian tax treaties. 
 
The Colombian reporter pointed out that the first step to counter hybrid mismatches under tax treaties is to 
have a possibility to obtain clear information on the treatment of a transaction in the other contracting 
state.143 Treaty provisions must therefore create an efficient, quick mechanism to request this information so 
that tax authorities of contracting states can decide on a case by case basis on whether the use of the treaty 
was legitimate or not. According to the reporter, this decision should be taken jointly, otherwise both 
countries will risk losing the effectiveness of their local tax incentives, even in cases of legitimate use. The 
reporter underlined that in the case of developing countries, such as Colombia, the joint decisions would also 
build expertise and will allow these countries to defend cases of legitimate use of preferential tax regimes or 
domestic tax incentives. 
 
As tax treaties ratified by Uruguay already have provisions ensuring that hybrid instruments and entities are 
not used to unduly obtain treaty benefits, i.e. beneficial ownership clauses, the reporter felt that the 
protection, at least for Uruguay, was sufficient with respect to its treaties.144  
 
The South African reporter stated that South African tax treaty’s provisions could be designed to ensure 
consistent application of the treaties in relation to hybrid entities.  Specifically, the interest and dividend 
definitions under Articles 10-11 could be aligned with the domestic tax law characterisation (in the source 
state) applicable to hybrid instruments.145 Such anti-hybrid rules included in tax treaties do not impose tax 
and it is therefore feasible to incorporate them in South Africa tax treaties.146 
 
                                                       
140 LOB’s are found in the tax treaties concluded by Brazil in 2002 with: South Africa (Art. 28(2)); Israel (Art. 25); Mexico (Art. 28); Peru 
(Art. 27(2)); Trinidad & Tobago (Art. 28); Turkey (Art. 28); Ukraine (Art. 11(8)); and with Venezuela (Art. 28). 
141 See Brazil report at 13-14. 
142 See supra 3.4.1.3. 
143 See Colombia report at 15. 
144 See Uruguay report at 14. 
145 See South Africa report at 29. 
146 Under the South African tax law (section 108(1) and (2) of the ITA), confirmed by case law (see for example Commissioner for the 
South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd (132/11) [2012] ZASCA 61 (8 MAY 2012), the tax treaties are incorporated into the 
domestic tax law in order to avoid double taxation and render reciprocal assistance in the administration and collection of taxes, merely 
allocating taxing rights – it is in fact common for all contracting states. 
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3.6.1.2 Introduction of domestic law provisions aimed at preventing exemption or non-recognition 
for payments that are deductible by the payer 
While the Brazilian reports indicated that it is feasible to introduce to Brazilian domestic tax law provisions 
preventing exemption or non-recognition of payments that are deductible by the payer,147 such provisions 
may raise issues regarding their compatibility with the non-discrimination provision of the Brazilian tax 
treaties because their application may lead to discriminatory situations between residents and non-
residents.148 
 
In the view of the Brazilian reporters, provisions preventing exemption or non-recognition of payments that 
are deductible by the payer should be applied equally to cross-border and domestic situations to not give 
rise to discriminatory situations between residents and non-residents under the non-discrimination provision 
of the Brazilian tax treaties. Although ECJ case law does not apply to Brazil, the reporters raised the 
question of discrimination in the context of ECJ case law.149 Applying domestic anti-hybrid rules equally to 
cross-border and domestic situations may not be an appropriate solution to avoid discriminatory situations 
between residents and non-residents based on this ECJ case law. As domestic provisions must be 
compatible with EU law, a consequence of using domestic provisions is that compatibility should be drawn 
from the provisions actual (ipso facto) rather than merely from formal (ipso iure) scope of application.150 That 
is to say, if the domestic anti-hybrid rule typically applies only in cross-border scenarios then it can be seen 
as indirect discrimination of taxpayers investing via entities established outside their resident state against 
taxpayers investing via entities established in their resident state.151 In addition, preventing base erosion and 
profit shifting in an effective and comprehensive manner in domestic situations is difficult.  As stated by AG 
Geelhoed, applying an anti-hybrid rule to a domestic situation causes a “considerable extra administrative 
burden for domestic companies and tax authorities, [it] is quite pointless and indeed counterproductive for 
economic efficiency [and is therefore] anathema to the internal market.”152 Prominent scholars express a 
similar critique with respect to domestic anti-avoidance provisions.153 
                                                       
147 See Brazil report at 14. 
148 One may, however, consider Rust’s view that a linking rule aimed at preventing exemption or non-recognition for payments that are 
deductible by the payer does not seem to be inconsistent with the non-discrimination provisions contained in tax treaties (their 
equivalents of Article 24(4) OECD MTC). Article 24(4) OECD MTC prohibits all discriminations which are based on residence of the 
recipient of the payments, while a discrimination based on criteria other than residence is still permitted.  Denying the deduction is not 
based on the residence of the enterprise receiving the payments, but rather that the payments are tax exempt at the level of the 
recipient company. Since criteria referring to residence and tax exemption are not identical, a domestic tax law provision preventing 
exemption or non-recognition of payments that are deductible by the payer does not violate Article 24(4) OECD MTC. Rust, supra n. 29, 
pp. 312, 318, and 324. 
149 See for example ECJ’s judgments of 7 September 2004 in the Manninen case (C-319/02), ECR 2004, p. I-07477, paragraphs 46 and 
53-54 and of 8 December 2011 in the Banco Bilbao case (C-157/10), ECR 2011, p. I-13023, paragraph 39. 
150 See ECJ’s judgment of 14 October 1999 in the Sandoz GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und Burgenland 
case, C-439/97, ECR 1999, p. I-07041, paragraph 19 and Advocate General (AG) Ph. Léger’s opinion on this case issued on 20 May 
1999, ECR 1999, p. I-07041, paragraphs 31-48. See also ECJ’s judgment of 8 July 1999 in the Société Baxter, B. Braun Médical SA, 
Société Fresenius France and Laboratoires Bristol-Myers-Squibb SA v Premier Ministre, Ministère du Travail et des Affaires sociales, 
Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances and Ministère de l’Agriculture, de la Pêche et de l’Alimentation case, C-254/97, ECR 1999, p. 
I-04809, paragraphs 12-13 and AG Saggio’s opinion on this case issued on 1 December 1998, ECR 1999, p. I-04809, paragraph 7. 
151 See B. J. M. Terra and P. J. Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th edition, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012, p. 
219; A. Zalasiński, Zakaz dyskryminacji w sferze podatków bezpośrednich w prawie podatkowym Wspólnoty Europejskiej, Warsaw: 
C.H. Beck, 2006, pp. 191-193; B. Kuźniacki, Komentarz do wyroku TS z dnia 8 lipca 1999 r. w sprawie C-254/97 Société Baxter i inni v. 
Premier Ministre i inni, ECR 1999, s. I-4809 in W. Nykiel and A. Zalasiński (eds.), Orzecznictwo Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii 
Europejskiej w sprawach podatkowych. Komentarz, Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2014, pp. 168-178. 
152 See UK: AG Geelhoed’s opinion 29 June 2006, Case C- 524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue, [2007] ECR I-2112, paragraph 68. 
153 See W. Schön, Taxing Multinationals in Europe, Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance 11 
(2012), p. 19; D. Smit, EU freedoms, non EU-countries and Company Taxation, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business (2012), p. 245; G. Maisto and P. Pistone, A European Model for Member States’ Legislation 
on the Taxation of Controlled Foreign Subsidiaries (CFCs) – Part 1, 48 Eur. Taxn. 10 (2008), pp. 508-509; D. Weber, Tax Avoidance 
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The application of domestic law provisions aimed at preventing exemption for or non-recognition of 
payments that are deductible by the payer raises issues of practicability in Brazil. That an application of the 
proposed provisions would require the taxpayer in the source country to verify the tax burden in the 
residence country in order to deduct an interest expense is impractical and an unacceptable burden to be 
carried by the taxpayer. The reporters propose that the tax authorities should find a solution so that the 
taxpayer will not be required to verify the tax burden of the non-resident. The implementation of such an anti-
avoidance rule would also hamper Brazil in effectively implementing its tax policy in attracting foreign 
investments via tax incentives, e.g. the deductibility in the source country could be denied where the 
residence country exempts the corresponding income. In practice, the tax benefit (exemption) provided by 
the residence country (Brazil) would be offset by the source country.154 
 
For Colombia, the reporter questions the logic in implementing a domestic solution before the mechanisms 
of exchanging tax information between Colombia and other countries are in force.155 Moreover, taxpayers 
should be given the opportunity to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose to enter a hybrid mismatch 
scheme to escape the application of the provisions aimed at preventing exemption or non-recognition for 
payments that are deductible by the payer. The reporter adds that such provisions should only be applicable 
to related parties, otherwise the taxpayer will have an unreasonable burden to demonstrate the tax treatment 
of income received by a third party with no obligation or interest to disclose such facts. 
 
The reporter of Uruguay considered this issue is irrelevant to Uruguay, since this country has the territorial 
system of taxation. Neither foreign income nor losses are taken into account for purposes of Uruguayan tax 
law.156 Seeing this issue more generally, i.e. from the perspective of other countries potentially involved in 
hybrid schemes, a deduction in a foreign country with non-inclusion in Uruguay may easily occur. A need to 
introduce a domestic anti-hybrid rule in Uruguay may still exist in light of the purpose of BEPS Action 2. 
 
No restrictions were note under the South African legal system that could prohibit this country to implement 
provisions preventing exemption or non-recognition for payments that are deductible by the payer.157 Some 
provisions are already in force in South African domestic law whereby the participation exemption for foreign 
dividends does not apply where the dividend has been claimed as a tax deduction by a payer in the foreign 
country.158 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and the EC Treaty Freedoms A Study of the Limitations under European Law to the Prevention of Tax Avoidance, Eucotax Series on 
European Taxation, Vol. 11, the Hague: Kluwer Law International (2005), p. 158. 
154 See Brazil report at 15. Note that there is a parallel between this discussion and the issues around the tax sparing provisions applied 
by Brazil. In this scenario, it was suggested that the mismatches must be qualified, in order to verify whether the very avoidance of the 
mismatch is a goal to be pursued. 
155 See Colombia report at 16. 
156 See Uruguay report at 14. 
157 See South Africa report at 30. 
158 See section 10B(2) of the ITA (1962). 
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3.6.1.3 Introduction of domestic law provisions aimed at denying a deduction for a payment that is 
also deductible in another jurisdiction 
Among all surveyed countries, only the South African reporters stated that there appears to be no bar to the 
introduction of such domestic law provisions aimed at denying a deduction for a payment that is also 
deductible in another jurisdiction.159  
 
However, no reporters considered such domestic intervention as a possibility, indicating that such 
intervention was not required. In the case of Brazil and Colombia, no provisions exist to consider foreign 
entities as tax transparent entities.160 This means that the double deduction (i.e. a deduction in Brazil or 
Colombia and in a foreign country) issue does not arise from the perspectives of the Brazilian and 
Colombian jurisdictions whenever a foreign subsidiary of a Brazilian or Colombian parent pays tax deductible 
expenses. The same conclusion, albeit for a different reason applies to Uruguay. As tax deductible expenses 
paid by a foreign subsidiary of the Uruguayan parent will be disregarded for Uruguayan tax purposes as a 
result of the territorial tax system, domestic intervention to prevent double deduction is unnecessary.161 The 
Colombian reporter reiterated the need for sufficient exchange of tax information’s mechanisms as a 
safeguarding provision (see section 3.6.1.2 above). 
 
 
3.6.2 The assessment of anti-hybrid legal measures adopted by some OECD Countries 
3.6.2.1 Rules requesting an attestation that the same expense or loss has not been deducted in 
another jurisdiction 
Among all surveyed countries, only the South African reporters indicated that the such attestation rules could 
be introduced in the domestic tax law of South Africa.162 An attestation of foreign tax treatment in the context 
of foreign tax credits is already required. There would be no bar, in South Africa, to introducing similar 
attestation requirements for deductions.163  
 
For Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay, the introduction of rules are impractical and irrelevant for the reasons 
supplied in section 3.6.1.3. above.164  
 
The Colombian reporter reiterated that rules requesting an attestation that the same expense or loss has not 
been deducted in another jurisdiction constitutes too great a burden on the taxpayer and thus should only be 
imposed for transactions between related parties. The Colombian reporter also underlined that even in such 
                                                       
159 See South Africa report at 30. Note that on 12 May 2016, the SARS hosted an industry workshop to share initial views on hybrid debt 
rules avoidance schemes which they perceive to be of concern and the proposed measures that will be taken, see the summary online 
at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/South_African_Treasury_revisits_hybrid_debt_rules_to_prevent_double_non_taxation/$FIL
E/2016G_01001-
161Gbl_ZA%20reasury%20revisits%20hybrid%20debt%20rules%20to%20prevent%20double%20non%20taxation.pdf. The proposals 
under BEPS Action 2, however, remain under consideration but are not part of the current legislative cycle agenda in the South Africa. 
160 See Brazil report at 15 and Colombia report at 16 and 8. Cf. supra 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, and 3.1.2. 
161 See Uruguay report at 14. Cf. supra 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, and 3.1.2. 
162 See South Africa report at 31. 
163 See section 6(1A) of the ITA. 
164 See Brazil report at 15, Colombia report at 16, and Uruguay report at 14. 
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a narrow scope the attestation should only be requested in the jurisdiction of the parent or head office. It 
should not be requested in the jurisdiction of the subsidiary/permanent establishment, as the information 
flows between related parties are not symmetric. The parent company/head office could have legitimate 
reasons for withholding information from some of its subsidiaries/permanent establishments. Consequently, 
it should provide the information if the reason is legitimate. Lastly, the reporter indicated that a safeguard 
provision is essential to ensure the taxpayer’s rights to prove the legitimate use of tax incentives. This is 
particularly important in the case of applying the rules in question in developing countries, because their tax 
policies are often concentrated on attracting foreign investments via tax incentives. 
 
3.6.2.2 The introduction of disclosure initiatives targeted at certain hybrid mismatch arrangements 
The issue of the introduction of disclosure initiatives targeted at certain hybrid mismatch arrangements is 
closely related to the considerations in section 3.6.2.1. above, since the obligation to disclose hybrid 
mismatch arrangement schemes coincides with the obligation to provide an attestation that the same 
expense or loss has not been deducted in another jurisdiction. In either case, taxpayers are obliged to 
submit information to tax authorities which is relevant for identifying and preventing tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches. 
 
Perhaps unsurprising, the pattern of answers is unchanged.  Among all surveyed countries, only the South 
African reporter confirmed the possibility of the introduction of the rules in question, i.e. rules on disclosure 
initiatives targeted at certain hybrid mismatch arrangements. It follows from the fact that this country already 
has in force a reportable arrangement provision165 and this mechanism could be extended to include 
targeted hybrid mismatch arrangements.166  
 
By contrast, the reporters of the other three countries were doubtful as to the introduction of such rules under 
their domestic legal systems.  
 
Colombia only accepts official apostilled translations of foreign legislation. Disclosing initiatives targeted at 
certain hybrid mismatch arrangements will often involve legislations in different languages.167 This creates a 
significant burden for taxpayers required to disclose their hybrid mismatch arrangements.  
 
In the case of Brazil and Uruguay, there is a high risk that such disclosure rules will be unconstitutional or 
against their domestic law.168  
 
The reporter of Uruguay indicated that, in terms of Uruguayan law, some types of disclosure of information 
might be illegal, or against the constitution, which must be studied on a case by case basis.  
 
                                                       
165 See section 35 of the Tax Administration Act. 
166 See South Africa report at 30. It should be noted that selected arrangements involving hybrid equity instruments are already 
reportable (see http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/SecLegis/LAPD-LSec-TAdm-PN-2016-02%20-
%20Notice%20140%20GG%2039650%203%20February%202016.pdf). 
167 See Colombia report at 17. 
168 See Brazil report at 15 and Uruguay report at 14. 
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The reporters of Brazil explained that the mandatory disclosure may not be allowed under the Brazilian 
constitutional system in light of the constitutional guarantee that no one shall be required to produce 
evidence against themselves. Hence, the only acceptable solution in Brazil may be voluntary disclosure, as 
opposed to mandatory disclosure. The Brazilian reporters added that the application of mandatory disclosure 
to accountable individuals should not include advisors, counsellors and other third parties as it raises 
concerns in respect of professional secrecy or legal privilege.169 
 
3.6.2.3 Rules addressing abusive foreign tax credit transactions 
Abusive foreign tax credit transactions do not seem to constitute a significant concern for the four countries 
surveyed. For Uruguay, such rules would be of no application since foreign tax credit are not be granted due 
to the use of a territorial tax system in this country. From a Brazilian tax policy perspective, abusive foreign 
tax credit transactions are not significant and therefore implementing the such rules is not in the interest of 
Brazil. In the case of South Africa, to the extent abusive foreign tax credit transactions fall outside the scope 
of the South African GAAR, such abusive foreign tax credit transactions could be combated by newly 
implemented anti-abuse provisions aimed specifically against the abusive foreign tax credit transaction. The 
Colombian reporter did not comment on the usefulness of such rules for Colombia, and just stated that such 
rules could be implemented in that country and they must always contain a safeguard provision allowing 
taxpayers to defend their transactions based on legitimate reasons. 
 
3.6.3 The feasibility of introducing a “mutual recognition” principle 
The principle of “mutual recognition” is based on the qualification established under the laws of the state of 
incorporation of a hybrid entity or the state of issuance of a financial instrument. It originates from the 
principle applied within the European Union in the context of trade in which a Member State should 
recognise the standards applied in the home state and, subject to the rule of reason principle, prohibit denial 
of access to its markets if these standards differ from its own standards.170  
 
For this paper, the OECD’s understanding of the “mutual recognition” principle in the context of dealing with 
outcomes of hybrid mismatches (the OECD’s linking rule) is followed.  This principle should be understood 
as a system by which: (i) as regards a financial instrument, the state of holding of the financial instrument will 
follow the qualification given by the state of issue of this instrument, and (ii), as regards an entity, the 
counterparty state will follow the qualification given to an entity by the state of incorporation of the entity.171 
This could have impact at two levels, i.e. transactions with the entity and profit distributions to 
members/disposals of member interests.172 The introduction of this principle is also understood to be an 
                                                       
169 See Federal Constitution: Art. 5, X; Article 198, Law 5,172/1966 (National Tax Code); Supplementary Law 105/2001(for banking 
secrecy specifically); Article 116, Law 8,212/1990; Article 998 of Decree 3,000/1996 (Income Tax Code); Ordinance RFB 2,344/2011 
and Ordinance RFB 3,541/2011. Other legislation and regulations at the State and Municipal level regarding the professional secrecy 
may apply. 
See Brazil report at and Brazil report on OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), at 16. 
170 See Ph. Genschel, Why no mutual recognition of VAT? Regulation, taxation and the integration of the EU's internal market for goods, 
14 Journal of European Public Policy 5 (2007), p. 748. 
171 See (OECD 2015), supra n. 12, pp. 11-12. 
172 Cf. Article 9 of a Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market, Official Journal of the European Union of 17 July 2016. This Directive says that “To the 
extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a double deduction, the deduction shall be given only in the Member State where such payment 
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alternative solution to a process of amending the domestic laws of the various countries to achieve co-
ordination between different domestic laws.173 
 
The reporters of surveyed countries took differing views on the feasibility of introducing such a “mutual 
recognition” principle based on the qualification established under the laws of the state of incorporation of a 
hybrid entity or state of issuance of financial instrument. 
 
The introduction of such a mutual recognition principle was most positively accepted by the reporters of 
Brazil. They agreed that the qualification respectively in the state of incorporation for hybrid entities and the 
state of issuance for hybrid instruments are adequate parameters for applying the mutual recognition 
principle.174 This positive view from the Brazilian reporters may stem from Brazil’s similar approach in 
relation to conflict of qualifications under the interest article in Brazilian tax treaties.175 
 
The reporter of Uruguay said that it is unlikely that such a “mutual recognition” would be implemented with 
the support of Mercosur (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur).  The regulations of Mercosur do not contain 
provisions harmonizing the tax systems of its member countries.176 However, the introduction of the “mutual 
recognition” principle may remain possible in Uruguay when compared to the Uruguayan domestic tax rule 
“regla candado”, i.e. the rule of application which concerns the tax treatment of payments made by a 
Uruguay tax resident to a foreign tax resident. 
 
The Colombian reporter pointed out that while the mutual recognition principle may be effective for 
countering tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches, its application carries a danger of loss of tax revenue for 
developing countries, such as for Colombia. Such a mutual recognition principle currently favours the 
developed world (as capital exporters).177 Under such a principle, developing countries, including Colombia, 
may be forced to give up their domestic (sovereign) definition of residence or of interest in order to apply the 
definition of a foreign (developed) jurisdiction.178 The reporter also indicated that the state of incorporation or 
issuance is easily interchangeable, and therefore taxpayers may incorporate companies or issue instruments 
in the jurisdictions with the most favourable definitions from the taxpayers’ perspective. Such jurisdictions will 
most often be countries in the developed world, for instance Delaware or Nevada states, for the American 
region, or certain EU Member States, for example Cyprus, Ireland or Luxembourg. Hence, the Colombian 
reporter concluded, the mutual recognition principle could be acceptable for Colombia and other developing 
countries, but only if the developing countries were involved in the discussion on the criteria for classifying 
an entity or instrument under the mutual recognition principle, and if manipulation of these conditions by 
taxpayers would not be easy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
has its source. To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without inclusion, the Member State of the payer shall deny 
the deduction of such payment.” Thus, under this Directive, the qualification of the financial instrument/hybrid entity of the state in which 
the payment has its source should be followed by the other state (the state of recipient of that payment). 
173 Cf. V. Thuronyi, Coordination Rules as a Solution to Tax Arbitrage, Tax Notes International (2010), pp. 1053-1060 and supra section 
2. 
174 See Brazil report at 16. Even though there was some debate on whether the state of incorporation is a better parameter than the 
state of source, the reporters tended to regard the former as the best approach, to ensure a uniform treatment on transactions with 
different jurisdictions. Regarding hybrid instruments, the state of issuance was not questioned as the best approach. 
175 See supra 3.4.1.3. 
176 See Uruguay report at 15. 
177 See Colombia report at 17. 
178 Although this will also work the other way around, it is likely that it will not be symmetric in practice, i.e. it will favour developed 
countries’ fiscal interests at the expense of developing countries. 
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The South African reporter analysed potential effects of the implementation of the mutual recognition 
principle in South Africa in various iterations, i.e. in relation to the tax treatment of hybrid instruments and 
hybrid entities (partnerships, trusts, and tax consolidated groups). The reporter concluded that from a 
revenue collection perspective, the implementation would appear to have little impact when changing the 
qualification of the entity, but may have significant impact when changing the qualification of a hybrid 
instrument.179 Similar to the conclusions from Colombia, the reporter indicated that South Africa, as a net 
importer of capital, would generally be expected to be the accommodator of foreign qualifications. This would 
mean that local tax revenues would be enhanced or compromised depending on whether the revised 
qualification of a hybrid instrument (i.e. after an application of the mutual recognition principle by South 
African tax authorities) would lead to the granting or denial of deduction that would otherwise have been 
denied or allowed. South Africa’s domestic law does include anti-tax avoidance provisions which operate to 
deny deductions in respect of certain specified hybrid instruments and transfers. Accordingly, a mutual 
recognition policy would only enhance revenue collection in those instances not covered by the anti-tax 
avoidance currently in force in South Africa. Generally, it may be difficult to conclude definitively on the likely 
impact on local revenue collection as the use of hybrid financing is unlikely to be equally distributed between 
those countries that provide funding to South Africa. The reporter concluded, however, that an application of 
the mutual recognition principle may introduce a bias towards reduced revenue collection in South Africa and 
it is in any event likely to introduce uncertainty in respect of local revenue collection. 
 
Furthermore, the South African reporter, similarly to the reporter of Colombia, indicated that the 
implementation of the mutual recognition principle can trigger qualifications to the benefit of revenue 
collection in developed countries. Since the South African government sees itself as having a development 
responsibility, it may be unwilling to introduce policies stemming from the mutual recognition principle which 
prejudice revenue collection in South Africa. However, South Africa has committed itself to supporting the 
international fiscal community in its BEPS measures, including Action 2,180 and thus it seems that the 
solution may be to partly implement the mutual recognition principle, for instance only in respect of entity 
qualifications.  
 
Lastly, the reporter of South Africa stated that South Africa is perceived by other member states of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) as the dominant supplier of capital between members. It 
is thus questionable whether member states of the SADC would agree to the policy promoted under the 
mutual recognition principle if it would result in giving up tax revenue in favour of South Africa. 
 
3.6.4 The possibility of the creation of a forum for sharing expertise, best practices, and 
experience in tax administration to combat abusive tax schemes 
Tax arbitrage by means of hybrid mismatches feeds on the informational asymmetry of the tax 
administrations of the concerned countries, with regard to the respective tax treatments of certain entities 
and financial instruments. In this respect, administrative co-operation on exchanging of tax information would 
                                                       
179 See South Africa report at 31-36. 
180 See (OECD 2015), supra n. 12. 
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provide a necessary tool for an introduction and application of domestic and treaty rules aimed against 
situations that may have allowed tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. It is however not so straightforward to 
pick an information exchange strategy suitable for the task. In this respect, an arrangement possibly worthy 
of considering is the Joint International Tax Shelter Information Centre (J.I.T.S.I.C.), set up by the tax 
administrations of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (later joined by Japan) in 
2004.181 The most noticeable feature of J.I.T.S.I.C. is the maintenance of a discussion forum to share 
expertise, best practices and experience in tax administration to combat abusive tax schemes. In this regard, 
the questions to be answered by the surveyed countries are: (i) whether the creation of such a forum, 
possibly at a regional level, would be realistic and sustainable based on the capacity of the tax 
administration of a surveyed country and (ii) how would that country amend the current structure of such 
forum (if at all) in order to better suit the needs and potential of the country’s tax administration? 
 
South Africa has already confirmed a willingness to participate in such fora via its partnership in the OECD’s 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.  Furthermore its partnership in a tax co-
operation agreement with India and Brazil could allow for co-operation as envisaged above. The South 
African Revenue Service (SARS) appears to have the resources to participate in such a forum in a 
meaningful way and therefore South Africa should be able to accommodate this project through its current 
structures.182 South Africa therefore appears prepared, legally and structurally speaking, to create and 
maintain a discussion forum to share expertise, best practices and experience in tax administration to 
combat tax avoidance. 
 
The Colombian reporter emphasized that forums, such as the JITSIC, provide a means for tax 
administrations to obtain information without placing an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer.183 The reporter 
stated that such forum could be established in Colombia and other Latin American countries. For efficient 
and effective sharing of information it is recommended that delegates of such forum should be only those 
from the highest level of the tax administrations of the Latin American countries. This would ensure that the 
forum will understand the gathered information and provide valuable insights that are not yet common 
amongst lower level tax officials of Latin American countries. Importantly, the reporter expressed concern 
related to the potential cost of setting up and maintaining a working forum among Latin American countries, 
since the tax administrations of these countries are struggling with low budgets and almost non-existent 
budgets for travel expenses. Hence, the reporter underlined that this financial challenge must be addressed 
before implementing a forum of this nature among Latin American countries.  A proposed solution would be 
to utilise existing networks and structures, such as creating a sub-commission at the Inter-American Center 
of Tax Administrations (“CIAT”), to host such a forum. 
 
The reporter of Uruguay was not as supportive as the reporter of Colombia with respect to the establishment 
of such fora. The reporter believes that although the Uruguayan tax authorities are improving their 
                                                       
181 Introductory background information on J.I.T.S.I.C. can be found online at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/aag-jitsic.htm 
182 See South Africa report at 37. 
183 See Colombia report at 18. The reported indicated that the members of JITSIC are transparent about their findings, publishing 
domestic rulings and lists of tax shelter or abusive transactions so that the taxpayer may have legal certainty. Furthermore, most of the 
countries involved in JITSIC have a similar legal background and share the same language. This would strengthen the case for creating 
a regional forum with countries sharing a language and a similar legal and tax structure. 
  
42 
relationships with foreign tax authorities through signing several TIEAs in the past few years, they have not 
reached a position yet in which an administrative co-operative forum could be established which would 
function at the level described above.184 
 
In the case of Brazil, the reporters believe that the CIAT could potentially play the role of the mentioned 
forum. Due to the lack of information regarding the functioning of the CIAT, it is currently not possible to 
determine the feasibility of the implementation and enforcement of that option.185  The reporters also 
cautioned that in establishing a forum involving countries exchanging tax information, the taxpayer’s rights to 
protect their personal data should be respected, i.e. the exchange of tax information among the tax 
administrations of involved countries should be done with proper notifications of taxpayers about the type of 
exchanged information and the taxpayers should be in position to express their opinion on the information 
exchanged. The issue, however does not arise insofar as such exchange does not reveal the identity of the 
taxpayer. 
 
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The comparative analysis of the issues related to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in Uruguay, Colombia, 
Brazil and South Africa allows us to make several conclusions. These will be followed by tax policy 
recommendations enabling developing countries to deal with this issue. The conclusions are predominantly 
drawn from the analysis in section 3, while the recommendations are drawn from a synthesis of all 
conclusions as well as from the analysis and observations of the reporters of the surveyed countries with 
respect to the topics noted in section 3. 
 
As the overview in section 3.6. shows, reaction to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches appears advanced in 
the South African tax administration. While tax administrations in Colombia, Brazil and Uruguay appear to 
have not shown very much interest in this regard so far, this level of reaction seems to be changing. In part, 
the reaction and lack of reaction seems to lie with willingness and readiness to deal with hybrid mismatches. 
Interestingly, South Africa’s awareness of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatch arrangements does not translate 
to co-operation between tax practitioners and tax administration in that country.186 It appears that tax 
authorities in Colombia, Brazil, and Uganda see few or no arrangements involving tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches, even though they exist among tax practitioners in these countries.  
 
The analysis of case studies by the surveyed countries with respect to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
reveals that schemes resulting in double deduction do not generally occur from the view of the surveyed 
countries if they are the country of residence of a parent company providing a loan to a foreign subsidiary.187 
This is explained in that Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa have no tax provisions allowing their tax 
authorities to identify a foreign subsidiary as a tax transparent entity. Furthermore, Uruguay’s territorial tax 
system does not address foreign income/losses for domestic tax law purposes. Conversely, hybrid mismatch 
                                                       
184 See Uruguay report at 15-16. 
185 See Brazil report at 16. 
186 This is perhaps explained in tax advisors being unwilling to share their knowledge of hybrid mismatch schemes with the tax 
authorities as they want to protect their clients from potential loss of tax benefits and tax authorities not wanting to reveal potential 
audits or test cases. 
187 Apart from the assumptions related to South Africa in Scenario A in section 3.3.1.2. according to which the hybrid entity situated in 
Country B is a trust and income or capital net of trust expenses is vested in a holding company resident in South Africa. 
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schemes seem to achieve double deductions where the subsidiary company paying interest to its parent 
company has its residence in the surveyed country. The same trend is observed with respect to hybrid 
schemes resulting in deductions with non-inclusion. While these findings may appear obvious as a result of 
multinational companies establishing subsidiaries in developing countries, there is an increasing trend of 
multinational companies in developing countries establishing subsidiaries in other countries, for example the 
Brazilian and South African multinational companies. 188 Thus, the findings are relevant for tax policy 
recommendations for such jurisdictions. 
 
Adding to the difficulty in application and awareness in the surveyed countries is the lack of case law in all.  
Only Colombia had publicly considered transactions utilizing hybrid mismatches. No data appears to be 
collected (at least no data exists in the public domain) measuring the revenue impact of tax arbitrage via 
hybrid mismatches in each of these countries. This is perhaps unexpected as it is usually impossible to 
conduct these measurements accurately or even based on the same assumptions in each jurisdiction.  
Difficulties in measuring frequently arise as, often with mismatches, from the perspective of one of the 
countries the hybrid mismatches does not result in minimization of taxation, nor in many cases is the 
mismatch contrary to the wording, or even the spirit, of the tax laws of the two (or more) countries. 
Mismatches do, however, take advantage of disparities and inconsistencies between tax laws of investigated 
countries (at least two). It is therefore usually impossible to determine which of two countries has lost its tax 
revenue, since both countries collect the exact amount of tax stipulated by their tax laws.189  
 
The analysis of current and prospective domestic and tax treaty provisions and practices aimed at 
preventing tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in the surveyed countries shows that South Africa is the only 
country to have legislated explicitly against tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches, albeit not necessarily 
reflecting recommendations under BEPS Action 2. Nevertheless, South Africa appears to be the most 
inclined and prepared to follow the recommendations of the OECD under BEPS Action 2 of all surveyed 
countries. Although the legislation that is in force in Uruguay is not specifically aimed at hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, the linkage rule “regla candado” – restricting the deductibility of interest paid by a Uruguayan 
company to a foreign lender if the lender is not taxed on the interest received from Uruguay – may have a 
direct impact on hybrid mismatch arrangements. Its existence, though, stems rather from Uruguay’s 
territorial tax system (i.e. excluding foreign income and expenses from being taken into account for purposes 
of taxation of residents) than its anti-hybrid tax policy. In Colombia and Brazil, only parts of their legislation 
are likely to affect hybrid mismatch arrangements, and then only indirectly. From the evidence collected it 
would seem that the above positions of the surveyed countries arise from: (i) awareness and willingness to 
deal with tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches; and (ii) the development of internal and external legal 
mechanisms aimed at tackling hybrid mismatches – a process that is also more advanced in South Africa 
compared to other countries in this study. 
 
                                                       
188 As pointed out by the reporters of Brazil and South Africa at the Conference “A Sustainable Path for Tax Transparency in Developing 
Countries”, 27 June, 2016, Oslo, see online: http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/global-tax-
tranparency/events/conferences/a-sustainable-path-for-tax-transparency-in-develop.html. 
189 See Lüdicke, supra n. 118, p. 51. Cf. (OECD 2015), supra n. 12, paragraph 2 at p. 15. Although the overall effect of the tax arbitrage 
via hybrid mismatches could perhaps be measured, this has never been done by the surveyed countries. 
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Nonetheless, in all the surveyed countries there appear to be no administrative guidelines discussing the 
scope and effects of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches or clarifying how anti-hybrid rules should be 
applied. This is not a unique position and can be juxtaposed with the German experience – German tax 
authorities have not issued any guidelines on the application of the German anti-hybrid rules for a decade, 
even though these rules were considered to be notably opaque from the start and have never been applied 
by tax authorities.190 This, however, did not prevent the OECD from promoting the German rules in the 2012 
Report on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements.191 Of course, it is not certain whether the problems in Germany 
are inherent in rules of this nature; they may indeed occur in other countries, including the surveyed 
developing countries, or if they may be caused by peculiarities of the German tax system. What is certain, 
however, is that the hybrid mismatches emerged years ago in Germany and remain despite the country’s 
highly developed tax administration and internationally competitive economy. From this evidence, two 
conclusions can be drawn. First, a fortiori, if a large, highly developed country like Germany, with long-
standing experience of combating tax avoidance and a well-functioning tax administration with the tools 
necessary to exchange tax information and knowledge of international tax law, has not been able, for more 
than ten years, to design and implement effective and appropriate anti-hybrid rules, it is unlikely that 
developing countries, including the surveyed countries, will be in a position to legislate and enforce domestic 
anti-hybrid rules in short order. Second, the OECD is noticeably one-sided when it comes to dealing with 
hybrid mismatches in the sense of focusing essentially on preventing double non-taxation or double 
deductions, without considering the problems that are likely to arise from the application of anti-hybrid rules. 
 
Turning to the recommendations for the surveyed countries regarding the feasibility of introducing the 
outcomes of the BEPS Action Plan 2, our general impression is that the surveyed countries, with the 
possible exception of South Africa, are currently not well prepared to do so. For this reason implementation 
of the BEPS Action Plan 2 cannot be recommended as a policy option for these countries at present. The 
recommendations under BEPS Action 2 should be carefully evaluated by these countries for implementation 
at a future date. However, an approach for the surveyed countries to adopt is provided in the form of three 
recommendations, which may be implemented consecutively or in parallel, depending on the needs. The 
surveyed countries should evaluate how to take the recommendations listed below into account (or at all) 
and whether or not to prioritize them in the order proposed below. The recommendations are more 
interconnected to each other than mutually exclusive. 
 
Recommendation I – Create effective legal mechanisms enabling the exchange of tax information  
The surveyed countries should introduce and/or further develop legal and administrative mechanisms that 
enable them to identify tax arbitrage by means of hybrid mismatches. A necessary ingredient here is 
effective legal arrangements allowing for the exchange of tax information. Without such mechanisms in place, 
anti-hybrid rules will be invalidated, since tax authorities will be unable to obtain and verify the information 
necessary for applying such rules. The OECD’s linking rule, based on the mutual recognition principle, 
requires an effective exchange of information. The principle can only apply if the tax provisions of the 
payee’s country are known and understood by the payer’s country (primary rule), and vice versa (defensive 
                                                       
190 See Lüdicke, supra n. 118, pp. 54-56. 
191 See OECD (2012), supra n. 23, paragraph 39 at p. 15. 
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rule).192 This highlights the need for a strong system of tax information exchange rules193 complementing the 
anti-hybrid rules. The most important step toward the prevention of tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches in 
the surveyed countries is to meet the standard of global fiscal transparency, since this standard assumes a 
well-functioning system of information exchange. 
 
Recommendation II – Increase human capacity, and technical and substantive knowledge required for 
identifying and dealing with tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches and develop a cooperative relationship 
between tax administrations and taxpayers 
The surveyed countries should increase the human capacity and technical and substantive knowledge of 
employees of the tax administrations to gain the expertise to address cross-border tax avoidance, including 
tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. Only after gathering, systematizing and understanding this knowledge 
will the surveyed countries be positioned to effectively proceed with further legislative action, such as the 
recommendations under BEPS Action 2. Furthermore, there is no reason adopt the BEPS Action 2 
recommendations if the peculiarities of domestic legislation make the perceived BEPS risk unlikely.  
 
The surveyed countries could consider facilitating the cooperation between taxpayers and their tax advisors 
and the tax authorities in relation to tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches. This would not only accelerate the 
process of identifying hybrid mismatches schemes by the tax administration, but also give tax advisors and 
their clients a voice in the prospective design of legal solutions in response to abusive hybrid arrangements. 
All concerned parties could benefit from this approach: tax authorities will increase their awareness of tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches, while tax advisors and taxpayers will be duly informed about the legislative 
and administrative boundaries in the use of hybrid entities and instruments. 
 
Recommendation III – design appropriate legal solutions for dealing with tax arbitrage via hybrid mismatches 
It would seem to follow that after the surveyed countries gain sufficient capacity and knowledge about tax 
arbitrage via hybrid mismatches and the dialogue between tax administrations and taxpayers on this issue is 
underway, the countries will be better positioned to consider appropriate legislative solutions to hybrid 
mismatches. It is recommended that Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, and Uruguay take into account 
peculiarities of their legal systems and the prosperity of their economies in the consideration of any 
implementation of the OECDs recommendations under BEPS Action 2. Several observations from the 
evidence analysed in section 3 should specifically be considered.  
 
First, there would appear to be no reason to implement anti-hybrid rules aimed at preventing double 
deductions or deductions with non-inclusions by the surveyed countries in cases where the parent company 
providing a loan to a foreign subsidiary is resident in one of the surveyed countries. As demonstrated above, 
in these cases neither double deductions nor deductions with non-inclusions appear as a result of the 
current structure of the tax systems of the analyzed countries.  However, anti-hybrid rules may be needed to 
target schemes where the parent company is resident outside these countries. 
                                                       
192 Cf. Rust, supra n. 29, p. 324. 
193 Cf. Ph. Baker, Improper Use of Tax Treaties, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, in Papers on Selected Topics in Administration of Tax 
Treaties for Developing Countries, Paper No. 9-A, UN, May 2013, available online at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/20130530_Paper9A_Baker.pdf, p. 4; F. Zimmer, Skatteparadis – noen skatterettslige problemstillinger, 50 Lov 
og Rett 4 (2011), p. 239; M. Orlov, The Concept of Tax Haven: A Legal Analysis, 32 Intertax 2 (2004), p. 111. 
  
46 
 
Second, even where anti-hybrid rules could be of relevance to the surveyed countries, the countries should 
analyse the impact these rules may have on the growth of their economies versus any addition taxes 
collected. Anti-hybrid rules should not be implemented if their application, as proposed under BEPS Action 2, 
is likely to have a negative impact on economic growth and/or tax collection. A good example (described in 
section 3.6.3. above) is the mutual recognition principle which is considered to prejudice revenue collection 
in South Africa and Colombia. It is anticipated that these countries would be most unwilling to implement this 
principle. 
 
Thirdly, where these countries have or may wish to create tax incentives under their domestic tax laws in line 
with the countries policies to attract foreign investment, it may be found that implementation of anti-hybrid 
rules may damage such incentives. This concern was repeatedly emphasized by the reporters of Colombia 
and Brazil.194 The surveyed countries should at least evaluate whether the recommendations under BEPS 
Action 2 will distort their current tax policy on granting tax incentives. 
 
Finally, to the extent that an introduction of anti-hybrid rules will be justified in the surveyed countries, they 
should bear in mind the following issues while doing so. 
(i) BEPS Action 2 envisages a complex and comprehensive package of legal solutions. This may contradict 
administrative simplification, which is one of the main concerns when drafting tax rules for developing 
countries. Law makers and tax administration officials in developing countries often lack the necessary 
technical and legal expertise to design and apply complex and comprehensive anti-tax avoidance 
provisions.195 The lack of administrative simplification may also hinder transparency in the application of 
tax law and judicial review of administrative decisions, indirectly increasing the possibility for corruption 
in developing countries.196  
(ii) The application of the primary linking rule obliges the payer’s jurisdiction, rather than the payee’s, to tax 
that part of the payment not included in the recipient’s income. The defensive linking rule obliges the 
payee’s jurisdiction to tax income derived from abroad without connection to the jurisdiction of the 
recipient. As a result of the application of defensive linking rules, the tax base of the source state can be 
eroded, and the right to levy tax falls back to the payee’s country.197 This reveals that the primary and 
defensive linking rules contribute to the achievement of the general approach of the OECD, which is that 
“all income should be taxed somewhere”,198 rather than to the achievement of the purpose according to 
which “all income [is] taxed where economic activities generating the income are performed and where 
value is created”.199 The division of tax revenue division under the principle of “all income should be 
taxed somewhere” may not guarantee the coherence of the international tax system, as is the purported 
aim of the OECD.200 
                                                       
194 See supra 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.2.1 with respect to Brazil and Colombia. 
195 See T. Dubut, Designing Anti-Base-Erosion Rules for Developing Countries in G. M. M. Michielse and V. Thuronyi, Tax Design 
Issues Worldwide, Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015, p. 154 
196 Id. 
197 See Ch. Kahlenberg and A. Kopec, Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements – A Myth or a Problem That Still Exists?, 8 World Tax J. 1 
(2016), p. 74. 
198 See. G. S. Cooper, Some Thoughts on the OECD’s Recommendations on Hybrid Mismatches, 69 Bull. Intl. Taxn. 6/7 (2015), p. 345. 
199  See OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, (OECD, 2014), p. 3, International Organizations’ 
Documentation IBFD. 
200 See Kahlenberg and Kopec, supra n. 197, p. 75. 
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(iii) It appears that the implementation of the recommendations under BEPS Action 2 may create legislative 
problems in the surveyed countries, not in the least because the complexity.201 Furthermore, BEPS 
Action 2 does not provide the “legal language” for the recommended rules. Legislators of interested 
countries must themselves find reasonable wording for the anti-hybrid rules that is compatible with their 
respective legal system.202  This may prove difficult in many developing countries (including those 
surveyed).  Furthermore, introducing mandatory disclosure requirements targeted at certain hybrid 
mismatch arrangements would most likely be unconstitutional in Brazil and Uruguay. Even if 
successfully introduced, such disclosure would place an unreasonably high burden of proof on 
taxpayers.203 It is proposed that the only acceptable solution for the disclosure in terms of the application 
of anti-hybrid rules in the surveyed countries would be voluntary disclosure. 
(iv) Finally, BEPS Action 2 explicitly implies an automatic application of the proposed anti-hybrid rules if a 
hybrid mismatch arrangement “gives rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes that can be attributed to the 
hybrid element in the arrangement.”204 This may in many instances entail the application of anti-hybrid 
rules beyond tax avoidance cases, thus entirely missing the target of tax arbitrage via hybrid 
mismatches.205 It contradicts the text of paragraph 4 of BEPS Action 2 saying that “the recommendations 
for the design of the domestic law rules called for under Action 2 … neutralise the mismatch in tax 
outcomes under a hybrid mismatch arrangement without disturbing any of the other tax, commercial or 
regulatory consequences (hybrid mismatch rules)” [emphasis added]. It would seem inappropriate to 
apply anti-hybrid rules automatically.  At the very least, a safeguard provision should be introduced to 
allow taxpayers to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for entering a hybrid mismatch scheme 
(before application of the anti-hybrid rule) and therefore avoid the application of anti-hybrid rules. It is 
submitted that these rules, if necessary at all in the surveyed countries, should only be applicable to tax 
avoidance cases. 
 
                                                       
201 Cf. Lüdicke, supra n. 118, p. 52. It includes six different rules for six identified hybrid scenarios with 15 pages of summary for all 
twelve recommendations, 130 pages of detailed explanation and description and another 280 pages of examples “to explain the 
operation of the rules in further detail”. 
202 Cf. Lüdicke, supra n. 118, pp. 51-53. 
203 See supra 3.6.4. 
204 See OECD 2015, supra n. 12, paragraph 281 at p. 95. 
205 See supra 1. 
